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ABSTRACT 
 Wildland fires are an enduring homeland security threat that destroys lives, 
property, and the environment annually. This thesis explores the concept that the 
application of the intelligence cycle is a practical approach to addressing threats and 
minimizing wildland fire impacts. To determine how effective the intelligence cycle can 
be in decreasing the impacts of disastrous wildland fires, the research examined the 
wildland fire problem, fire service intelligence, and the intelligence cycle. Research 
affirmed there is no current application of a wildland fire intelligence cycle. A case study 
analysis concluded that components of the intelligence cycle currently take place in 
wildland fire incidents, but not in a formalized process. This thesis argues that the 
intelligence cycle is a valuable framework for re-evaluating how the fire service collects, 
analyzes, and disseminates information about wildland fire threats. As a result of research 
and analysis, several recommendations were identified that include policy adoption at the 
national level and enhanced wildland-fire intelligence integration. The intelligence cycle 
adoption will ultimately help the fire service better communicate with the communities it 
services, and the resulting enhanced communication will help the fire service be more 
successful in mitigating the effects of those fires that do occur. 
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The threat of wildland fires is an issue of national security, as it relates to disaster 
management and the protection of U.S. citizens. Numerous wildfires, burned homes, 
environmental consequences, and the evacuation of thousands are problems that occur 
nearly every fire season. Tactical considerations are the primary focus of how the fire 
service deals with the wildland fire problem. However, having both a tactical and 
strategic approach allows fire service decision makers to make informed decisions that 
can minimize the impacts of wildland fires before, during, and after the fires. Given the 
limitations of current tactical approaches, other solutions that will complement them are 
worthy of consideration. Specifically, the application of the intelligence cycle has merit 
in combating wildland fires. 
Providing a general overview of the intelligence cycle is not a simple task. 
Debates ensue about how to best describe it and its origination. Similarities in the core 
components, such as direction, collection, and processing of early versions of the 
intelligence cycle are evident in later iterations adopted by numerous intelligence 
agencies. Although fire services have not adopted a formalized intelligence cycle 
approach, advances in information sharing have been made.  
The literature in this thesis demonstrated a gap in research and thinking about the 
application of the intelligence cycle to wildland firefighting. Little or no discussion 
appears in the firefighting literature about the use of the intelligence cycle or other 
intelligence principles. Despite the lack of defined research on a wildland fire intelligence 
cycle, some value is apparent in its use, which indicates the need to further evaluate its 
usefulness for the wildland fire problem. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
intelligence cycle model is evaluated for wildland fire application, due to the simplicity 
of the steps. 
Two intelligence dissemination platforms are examined, the wildfire centric 
geographic area coordinating centers (GACCs) and the all-risk or all-hazard focused 
national network of fusion centers. It appears that linking the GACCs and the national 
 xviii 
network of fusion centers may be critical in supporting wildland firefighting activities 
from the fire prevention level all the way down to the tactical level.  
The research examines the role of intelligence and intelligence-collection methods 
in the current wildland fire environment. The fire service does not formally characterize 
the intelligence-collection methodologies as precursors to actionable intelligence. The 
robust nature of technology and its application to the wildland fire problem further 
supports the role of intelligence collection. The concepts of fire service intelligence, the 
intelligence collection types, and the technology component of intelligence collection as 
they relate to the CIA intelligence cycle are discussed.  
Although the fire service does not use a formalized intelligence cycle, some 
current practices are consistent with the existing intelligence cycle models. When looking 
at the components parts and processes currently in use, information indicates a value in 
the application of the intelligence cycle for fire service decision makers. This thesis 
discusses the fire service’s informal adoption of the five constituent components of the 
CIA intelligence cycle model, including the strengths and the gaps or problems of each in 
the way they currently are applied in the fire services.  
Planning for large-scale wildland fires and their prevention is an enduring focus 
that depends on effective intelligence production. The collection and processing of 
information, such as weather indices and geographic areas at risk, support the planning 
portion of the cycle. Current analysis actions create finished fire intelligence that can be 
further enhanced in the future as technology evolves. Expanding dissemination can also 
support the adoption of the intelligence cycle 
Analysis indicates various components or elements of the intelligence cycle were 
at play in the 2012 Waldo Canyon fire, even though a conscious effort may not have been 
made to use any formalized intelligence cycle model. Deconstructing the Waldo Canyon 
fire and examining the various parts of the intelligence cycle’s relevance to the event 
provides a framework for application in the wildland fire environment to minimize 
wildfire impacts on communities. The use of the intelligence cycle to prevent and manage 
fires may evolve to help fire service and related agencies respond to external demands 
 xix 
and societal implications in the wildland fire environment. An opportunity exists to 
formalize a well-defined wildland fire centric model.  
This thesis draws conclusions about the intelligence cycle and its specific 
application to wildland fire prevention and management. Shortcomings and 
implementation issues are highlighted, and evidence from other fields that effectively 
utilize the intelligence cycle and scholarly research findings are used to generate related 
solutions that may lead to best practices in fire services. This paper posits that the 
intelligence cycle will be a practical approach to wildland fire prevention, response, and 
management. 
Driven by the desire to minimize the impacts of disastrous wildland fires, the 
author provides recommendations for the future. To be implemented successfully, several 
recommendations will need significant high-level policy support. The support may be 
easier to garner as potential benefits are quantified as lives saved, property loss reduced, 
and environmental impacts minimized. Using a well-defined intelligence process focused 
on saving lives, protecting property, and reducing environmental impacts in a fiscally 
responsible manner is a prudent wildland fire policy. This thesis argues that the 
intelligence cycle is a valuable framework for thinking and re-evaluating how 
information about wildland fire threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated. Its 
adoption will ultimately help the fire service better communicate with the communities it 
services, and the resulting enhanced communication will help the fire service be more 
successful in preventing wildland fires and mitigating the effects of those that do occur.  
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Minimizing and mitigating the threat of wildland fires is an issue of national 
security, as it relates to disaster management and protection of U.S. citizens. Numerous 
wildfires, burned homes, environmental consequences, and the evacuation of thousands 
are problems that exist nearly every fire season. According to the National Interagency 
Fire Center, roughly 68,000 wildfires burned 10.1 million acres in 2015,1 which 
exceeded the average of 6.6 million acres burned from 2000 to 2014.2 Many experts who 
are troubled by ongoing disasters consider options for federal support to determine ways 
to prevent the severity of the impacts.3 
Tactical considerations are the primary focus of how the fire service deals with 
the wildland fire problem. The operational nature of tactical considerations includes how 
to fight the fires and stop the ongoing impacts once the fires start. However, having both 
a tactical and strategic approach allows fire service decision makers to make informed 
decisions that can minimize the impacts of wildland fires before, during, and after 
wildland fires.  
Given the limitations of current tactical approaches, other solutions that will 
complement them are worthy of consideration. Specifically, the application of the 
intelligence cycle may have merit in combating wildland fires. The intelligence cycle is a 
systematic means to process information to create actionable intelligence. With that in 
mind, using key core concepts from the intelligence community, such as ongoing 
intelligence collection, analysis of the acquired data, generating intelligence products, 
and identifying new issues and applying them to wildland fires may be beneficial. The 
basic model of the intelligence process is called the “intelligence cycle.” When supported 
by the intelligence cycle, the intelligence analysis process of gathering information and 
                                                 
1 “Fire Information,” National Interagency Fire Center, accessed February 6, 2016, http://www.nifc. 
gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_totalFires.html. 
2 National Interagency Fire Center. 
3 Katie Hoover, Federal Assistance for Wildfire Response and Recovery, CRS Report No. R41858 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 1–5, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R418 
58.pdf. 
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creating products can work towards preventing the destructive nature of these fires. The 
intelligence cycle can also contribute to tactical decision making by providing 
intelligence products that can aid incident commanders in making appropriate 
suppression and risk mitigation decisions. Natural disasters, including wildland fires, are 
similar to terrorist attacks because they often are not predictable, and they result in 
destruction and social upheaval.  
This thesis used the concept that wildland fires are indeed a homeland security 
threat and the institutionalization of the intelligence cycle may be a practical approach to 
addressing their threat and minimizing their impacts on people, nature, and structures. 
The various iterations of the intelligence cycle provide an organized way to gather and 
analyze information in a streamlined way that will allow fire service officials to address 
the complexities of the wildland fire problem and overcome current difficulties in 
identifying effective solutions. Further, the resulting emergent data can serve as a 
foundation for future wildland fire prevention policy. A process is already in use in other 
fields that may be able to help with that problem, that of the intelligence cycle.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Given the scale of wildland fires, the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) was 
created to provide a starting point for an overall strategy that includes the five key 
mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.4 The NPG is 
a vital element of the National Preparedness System mandated in the presidential policy 
directive (PPD) 8. The PPD 8 of 2011 “is aimed at strengthening the security and 
resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the 
greatest risk to the security of the Nation.”5 This systematic preparation occurs as the five 
                                                 
4 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-
2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf. 
5 “Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness,” Department of Homeland Security, last 
published September 23, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-prepared 
ness. 
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individual mission areas interact and linearly build upon each other.6 The prevention 
mission area is focused on stopping or minimizing the impacts of homeland security 
threats prior to occurrence. The protection mission area is centered on safeguarding 
against threats and hazards. The mitigation mission area expects to reduce negative 
impacts and lessen ongoing results. The response mission is often highlighted due to the 
direct action needed to save lives, property and the environment immediately through 
incident stabilization. Lastly, the recovery mission area highlights actions to return to 
normal after a catastrophic event occurs. The core capabilities and mission areas directly 
align with the wildland fire problem as a homeland security concern. Many directly or 
indirectly relate to components of the intelligence cycle examined later. 
On a more focused level, an indicator of a wildland fire’s destructive significance 
and whether it is viewed as a homeland security issue is the approval of a Department of 
Homeland Security fire management assistance grant (FMAG) during the incident.7 
When a governor’s authorized representative submits a FMAG application, several 
criteria must be met that include a threat to lives and property, high fire danger, lack of 
firefighting resources and potential for major economic impact.8 Statistical analyses 
indicate that wildland fires are significant problems that impact lives, property, and the 
environment and do so with momentous financial costs. As a point of reference, during 
the 2013 fiscal year, 29 approved FMAG declarations affected nine western states at the 
cost of $109,070,405 with each on average costing $3,761,048.9  
                                                 
6 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-
25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf. 
7 “The FMAG is authorized by the Stafford Act Grants and is provided to States, tribal and local 
governments. The FMAG is for the mitigation, management and control of any fire burning on publicly 
(non-federal) or privately-owned forest or grassland that threatens such destruction as would constitute a 
major disaster.” Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fire Management Assistance Grant Program 
Guide (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 10. 
8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 10. 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Relief Fund, Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional 
Justification (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/ 
about/budget/11f_fema_disaster_relief_fund_dhs_fy13_cj.pdf. 
 4 
Another sign that wildfire management is a significant homeland security issue is 
the annual wildfire management appropriations approved by Congress.10 The Forest 
Service and the Department of the Interior (DOI) primary distributions fund the Wildland 
Fire Management (WFM) account and Federal Land Assistance, and Management and 
Enhancement Act (FLAME) account. The FY2017 budget identified a combined 
allocation of $4.18 billion.11  
Recent governmental reports attempt to identify some of the challenges facing 
wildland fire management. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 
DOI created the 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review (QFR), which is the result of a strategic 
risk assessment process. The QFR identified several problem areas and stated, “The 
wildland fire management community currently lacks an innovation agenda or a list of 
priorities.”12 Although several areas of weakness were found, the QFR identified the 
workforce as extremely technologically adept and indicated that it efficiently uses 
advanced analytics tools to process surveillance data.13 A positive change that resulted 
from the recommendations of the 2014 QRF was the use of crowdsourcing that allowed 
stakeholders to provide input.14 Crowdsourcing is also a form of intelligence collection, 
originated online to solicit feedback from governmental agencies, fire service 
professionals, industry experts, non-governmental organizations, and citizens on how best 
to improve wildland fire management. Focus groups were created to capture valuable 
input from those actively engaged in wildland fire intelligence. New priorities have not 
been determined for the 2018 QFR, but no evidence indicates that a new, innovative 
model, such as a wildland fire intelligence cycle will be included and adopted that may be 
                                                 
10 Kelsi Bracmort, Wildfire Management: Federal Funding and Related Statistics, CRS Report No. 
R43077 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1–18, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mi 
sc/R43077.pdf. 
11 Katie Hoover, Wildfire Management Funding: Background, Issues, and FY2018 Appropriations, 
CRS Report No. R45005 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 10, https://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R45005.pdf. 
12 Department of the Interior Office of Wildland Fire, 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review Final Report 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2015). 
13 Department of the Interior Office of Wildland Fire. 
14 Department of the Interior Office of Wildland Fire, 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review, Help Shape the 
Future of Wildland Fire Management (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2014), https:// 
www.forestsandrangelands.gov/QFR/documents/2014QFR_Brochure_20140313.pdf.  
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supported by current and emerging technologies. A purpose of this this thesis research 
would be to provide a path for developing wildland fire intelligence techniques and 
procedures in support of wlldland fire management.  
Identifying the issues of most concern for policymakers is the foundational phase 
of the intelligence process. According to the intelligence model, defining the answers 
essential to make educated decisions will outline the best route to a solution. The process 
involves laying out a plan for acquiring the desired information, followed by 
implementing the plan and acquiring the information, often in phases. Once the necessary 
information gathering is complete, the data are sorted and analyzed to create intelligence 
products. Finally, the intelligence recommendations are distributed to target audiences of 
fire service leadership and other public safety agencies. The activities of the intelligence 
cycle pull together information, convert it into intelligence, and make it available to end-
users. The finished intelligence products often reveal additional issues, which lead to 
more inquiries; thus, as one cycle ends, the next one begins. Using this model to create 
actionable intelligence regarding wildland fires may reduce their negative impacts 
through improved early warning and more focused information compared to current 
implementation strategies. This intelligence can, in turn, facilitate firefighters’ ability to 
make tactical and strategic decisions from a better-informed position.  
The traditional characterization of the intelligence cycle is that the practitioners of 
the cycle provide decision makers with the necessary information to make educated 
choices. On a larger scale, the intelligence cycle is used to prevent or lessen the impact of 
unwanted events from occurring. In wildland fire arena, the intelligence cycle can equip 
fire leaders to make better-informed decisions that will lessen the destructive nature of 
fires. The application of the intelligence cycle to natural events, such as wildland fires, is 
reasonable, although its application to wildland fire management likely requires a 
national, strategic-level policy that may directly impact fire personnel at the tactical level. 
Using a non-traditional approach of the intelligence cycle for wildland fires will result in 
better coordination between public safety domains. While the impacts from wildland fires 
do not appear to be a transient problem, the non-typical use of the intelligence cycle may 
be the solution necessary to reduce the adverse effects of these fires. 
 6 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis aims to provide recommendations that can help prevent and manage 
destructive wildland fires. The overarching research questions for this thesis are the 
following: 
• How effective can the intelligence cycle be in decreasing the impacts of 
disastrous wildland fires? 
• Assuming evidence suggests the intelligence cycle would be an effective 
approach, how might the cycle be best utilized by the fire service? 
The answer to the first overarching research question may be that the intelligence 
cycle may or may not be realistically or effectively applied, but at the very least, some of 
its components may be useful to address the wildfire problem. Hence, the research and 
analysis of this thesis tested the suggestion that the intelligence cycle may be a viable 
“fix” to the problem of disastrous wildland fires. This thesis also provides that the fire 
service can adapt or modify the intelligence cycle to fit the problem. 
This research focuses on evaluating existing policy and determines whether viable 
policy recommendations or alternative options are available to the current challenges the 
nation faces in preventing and managing destructive wildfires. Due to the very nature of 
wildland fires, the managerial focus is primarily driven by the tactical response after the 
fire has started. Significant wildland fire suppression policies have been developed 
explicitly to focus on response, but those that relate to wildland fire prevention and risk 
reduction also exist. This thesis analyzes the value of those policies while concentrating 
on the application of the intelligence cycle to support actions aimed at reducing the 
impacts of wildland fires. The emphasis is on both the tactical and strategic level, which 
involves evaluating existing wildland fire policy, and examining how the intelligence 
cycle may potentially integrate with the current policy to create a best-practices approach 
in the future. 
 7 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines the intelligence cycle and its application to wildland fires. It 
uses a case study of the June–July 2012 Waldo Canyon fire in Pike National Forest near 
Colorado Springs to identify a relationship between wildland fire endeavors and the 
intelligence cycle. The Waldo Canyon fire was selected for evaluation because it was one 
of the most significant fires in Colorado history, and a significant amount of literature 
and data exist about it.  
Eugene Bardach’s eightfold path was used to conduct the analysis for this thesis. 
The steps of the eightfold path are the following. 
• Step One: Define the problem 
• Step Two: Assemble some evidence 
• Step Three: Construct the alternatives 
• Step Four: Select the criteria 
• Step Five: Project the outcomes 
• Step Six: Confront the trade-offs 
• Step Seven: Decide 
• Step Eight: Tell your story15 
The primary objectives of this thesis are to work through the steps of the eightfold 
path and identify plausible solutions to address improvements to the wildland fire 
problem in the United States better. That process began with clearly describing the 
wildland fire problem, which entailed defining its scope, scale, and complexities. That 
foundational information was used to move through the remaining steps of the eightfold 
path, which identified several areas where components of the intelligence cycle were 
currently in use. The analysis of the Waldo Canyon fire included examining what 
                                                 
15 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis (Los Angeles: Sage, 2012). 
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occurred at the fire and determining whether any intelligence processes or components of 
the intelligence cycle were employed. The components of intelligence collection, 
technological applications, and the intelligence cycle were carefully studied to determine 
correlations with the current wildland fire situation. Another aim of the study was to 
establish whether best practices were used to address the fire or whether the needed 
intelligence was lacking before, during, or after the historic fire.  
The results of the research and analysis yield a set of recommendations to answer 
the research questions of whether the intelligence cycle can be effective in addressing the 
wildland fire problem, and if so, how the cycle can be used to decrease the impact of 
disastrous wildland fires.  
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapter II is the literature review and examines information sources that include 
the scope of the wildland fire problem, the intelligence cycle, the intelligence cycle 
application to wildland fires, fire service intelligence, and regional intelligence entities. 
Chapter III focuses on intelligence collection in support of the fire service and includes 
fire service intelligence, the relevance of intelligence collection, and technology role in 
intelligence collection. Chapter IV provides an overview of the intelligence cycle model 
and identifies correlation when applied to wildland fires. Chapter V focuses on a case 
study of the Waldo Canyon fire and how it relates to the components of the intelligence 
cycle, including planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Lastly, 
Chapter VI ends with findings, limitations, recommendations, and conclusions. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides an analysis of a range of topics specific to the 
wildland fire problem and the intelligence cycle process and its role in public safety. The 
review is organized into five sections: analysis of the wildland fire problem, historical 
and current processes and practices of the intelligence cycle, existing fire service 
intelligence, regional intelligence practices, and policies, and the intelligence cycle’s role 
in the fire service and its potential application to wildland fires. The wildland fire 
problem is examined from several different perspectives that include scientific positions 
based on scholarly research and policy perspectives in the fire safety field and related 
service areas. Scientific views and evidence are drawn from research in the fields of 
physical, life, and social sciences, and policy perspectives are considered from various 
governmental agencies and nongovernment organizations, including national 
environmental groups.  
The data sources used in this literature review primarily consist of scholarly and 
field-specific books and manuals, scientific journals, and government documents. Subject 
matter experts (SMEs), commonly with doctorate degrees, and scientists provide much of 
the wildland fire academic information. As a contrast, practitioners from the intelligence 
community write much of the literature focused on intelligence. The current review 
provides an integrated approach that includes an academic discussion of key topics in 
addition to the practical application perspective. 
A. THE WILDLAND FIRE PROBLEM 
The wildland fire problem is not easily solved and requires input from a variety of  
stakeholders. Evaluating the diverse perspectives and coupling that with the know and 
percieved limitations of current policies and practices provides a starting point.  
1. Diverse Perspectives  
Examining the totality of the wildland fire problem is complex, and various 
approaches can be used. Looking at the problem from multiple scientific perspectives and 
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considering their policy implications provides a starting point. This section describes 
philosophical differences that exist among different scientific disciplines and related 
policy perspectives and analyzes their value in resolving the complexity of the current 
wildfire problem.  
Wildland firefighting is a discipline unto itself that begins with primary firefighter 
education. Generally, the earliest courses are in the physical sciences, because they are 
focused on the physical and biochemical aspects of fire and the materials it burns. Many 
researchers whose work is examined in this thesis are deeply rooted in the physical 
science world, and their position on the wildland fire problem is often narrowly focused 
on topics specific to fire science growth and spread. For example, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) researchers, who are largely grounded in the physical 
sciences, characterize their perspective by stating, “at its core, the wildland fire problem 
is a structure ignition problem and the best approach to reducing the severity of the 
problem is to lessen the potential for structure ignition.”16 This perspective suggests that 
altering the ignition potential will decrease the impacts of wildland fires. The perspective 
could be viewed as self-limiting due to its narrow focus on ignition principles. Its limited 
value is likely rooted in the institute’s focus on the aftermath of wildland fires, which 
centers on the variable levels of damage and how structures either inhibit or enable the 
destruction.17 Characterizing or quantifying a range of wildland fire ignition concepts is a 
relatively new science that is an essential component to describing and solving the 
problem. 
The life science research perspective aligns with ecosystem studies and 
climatology. Much of the life science content related to wildland fires centers on 
managing ecosystems and mitigating risks to human and wildlife communities.18 The 
ecosystems provide the vegetative fuels in wildland fires and managing these fuels 
                                                 
16 William Mell, “The Wildland–Urban Interface Fire Problem—Current Approaches and Research 
Needs,” International Journal of Wildland Fire Int. J. Wildland Fire 19, no. 2 (2010): 238.  
17 Joan L. Pellegrino, Nelson P. Bryner, and Erik L. Johnsson, Wildland-Urban Interface Fire 
Research Needs—Workshop Summary Report, NIST Special Publication 1150 (Gaithersburg, MD: 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Department of Commerce, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.60 
28/NIST.SP.1150. 
18 Max A. Moritz et al., “Learning to Coexist with Wildfire,” Nature 515, no. 7525 (2014): 58.  
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equates to a reduction of risk. As a life science researcher, Halsey argues that the current 
way of conducting business is ineffective from an ecological impact perspective.19 A 
common theme throughout much of the life science aligned literature is the need to 
respond to climate change and this nation’s continued development of fire-prone 
landscapes despite documented climate shifts. These studies suggest that the expansion 
into these areas will only compound the current wildland fire problems.20 Warmer and 
drier conditions lead to longer fire seasons that result in more frequent and more 
destructive fires.21 
Social science also provides insights into the wildland fire problem since human 
interaction is critical to the discussion. It is important that policymakers realize that social 
sciences experts support the creation of long-term policy decisions through community 
engagement to achieve success. It is equally important for policymakers to have a clear 
understanding of how the public living in high-risk areas interprets the wildland fire 
problem.22 This understanding is realized by communicating and implementing policy 
and plans deemed acceptable to the public.23 This community acceptance is 
accomplished when social science research examines societal values, beliefs, and 
mindsets.24 Understanding how the community views the wildland problem helps 
establish what the needs of the community are.  
The integration of physical, life, and social sciences is not easily accomplished 
due to the different focuses and perspectives among them in regard to both research and 
                                                 
19 Richard W. Halsey, Fire, Chaparral, and Survival in Southern California (San Diego: Sunbelt, 
2008). 
20 Chad T. Hanson et al., “Setting the Stage for Mixed- and High-Severity Fire,” in The Ecological 
Importance of Mixed-Severity Fires: Nature’s Phoenix, ed. Dominick A. DellaSala and Chad T. Hanson 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015), 3–21.  
21 Jeremy S. Littell et al., “A Review of the Relationships between Drought and Forest Fire in the 
United States,” Global Change Biology 22, no. 7 (2016): 2353–2369.  
22 Paul R. Lachapelle and Stephen F. McCool. “The Role of Trust in Community Wildland Fire 
Protection Planning,” Society & Natural Resources 25, no. 4 (2012): 321–335. 
23 Michael Czaja, “Integrating Social Science Research into Wildland Fire Management,” Disaster 
Prevention and Management 23, no. 4 (May 2014): 381–94. 
24 Jeffrey J. Brooks et al., “Collaborative Capacity, Problem Framing, and Mutual Trust in Addressing 
the Wildland Fire Social Problem: An Annotated Reading List,” The Bark Beetles, Fuels, and Fire 
Bibliography (2006): 48.  
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practice. Ideally, the concepts of each science can be synthesized into a well-integrated 
best practices recommendation. Instead, the complex differences amongst the sciences 
have primarily led to incongruity due to philosophical disagreement; if synthesis is 
desired, it requires dialog between practitioners.25 Difficulties arise when messaging and 
marketing wildland fire plans and policies to communities at risk. Each scientific 
viewpoint markets their own vision to the public. The undesired result of the marketing 
can be a biased perspective supportive of one science over another that can minimize a 
collaborative point of view. No single solution on how to deal the problem exists. 
2. Limitations of Current Practices and Policies  
Each year, Congress identifies the amount of wildfire management funding for 
relevant agencies, such as the United States Forest Service (USFS) through the DOI.26 
Should wildfire suppression funding become exhausted during any given year, agencies 
are authorized to transfer funds between accounts to pay for suppression activities. The 
practice of borrowing funds from the USFS and DOI accounts to pay for fire suppression 
undermines other land management programs, including those intended to decrease long-
term wildfire risk and costs, such as fuel reduction.27 Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) reports validate the pervasive, destructive nature of wildland and wildland-urban 
interface (WUI) fires, yet the funding for preventing and suppressing them is not 
adequate even though research data and CRS reports validate the argument that the 
wildland fire problem is of homeland security importance.28 
Other policy level literature sources focus on life safety and environmental 
concerns, and some environmental policies may overlap with aspects of life science 
perspectives. For example, the USFS supports policies that use controlled and prescribed 
                                                 
25 Halsey, Fire, Chaparral, and Survival in Southern California. 
26 Ross W. Gorte, Federal Funding for Wildfire Control and Management, CRS Report No. RL33990 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33990.pdf. 
27 William L. Painter, Department of Homeland Security: FY2015 Appropriations in the 114th 
Congress, CRS Report No. R43884 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), http:// 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43884.pdf. 
28 Bruce R. Lindsay and Francis X. McCarthy. Stafford Act Declarations, 1953–2014 Trends and 
Analyses, and Implications for Congress, CRS Report No. R42702 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42702.pdf. 
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burning to minimize the threat of conflagration.29 The principle is that over time, 
ecosystems become unhealthy, and the dead and dying plant life contributes to hazardous 
fuel loading, a concern among environmentalists. The USFS further defines management 
of wildland fires through prescribed burning by using the right fire at the right place at 
the right time, which is supported by intelligence and broad area surveillance and 
analysis: The USFS uses prescribed burning to do the following: 
• Reduce hazardous fuels, protecting human communities from extreme 
fires 
• Minimize the spread of pest insects and disease 
• Remove unwanted species that threaten species native to an ecosystem 
• Provide forage for game 
• Improve habitat for threatened and endangered species 
• Recycle nutrients back to the soil 
• Promote the growth of trees, wildflowers, and other plants30 
Not all life science researchers agree on the best approach to reducing the risk of a 
conflagration in this way. Chaparral researcher Halsey takes an opposing view to the 
controlled and prescribed burning policies of the USFS. He contends that field research 
fails to show that vegetation needs to burn every 20 to 30 years to renew and that 
prescribed burning timeframes should not depend solely on the age of the vegetation; the 
variable nature of vegetative types makes the policy faulty.31 Halsey’s argument provides 
an example of when environmental policy conflicts with the life safety policies of 
                                                 
29 A. Sydney Johnson and Philip E. Hale, “The Historical Foundations of Prescribed Burning for 
Wildlife: A Southeastern Perspective,” in The Role of Fire in Nongame Wildlife Management and 
Community Restoration: Traditional Uses and New Directions Proceedings of a Special Workshop 
Nashville, Tennessee, September 15, 2000 (2002): 11–23, https://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/gtr/gtr_ 
ne288/gtr_ne288.pdf#page=16. 
30 “Prescribed Fire,” U.S. Fire Service, accessed December 15, 2016, https://www.fs.fed.us/manag 
ing-land/fire/resilient-landscapes/prescribed-fire.  
31 Halsey, Fire, Chaparral, and Survival in Southern California, 28. 
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agencies, such as the USFS. Specifically, Halsey questions the effectiveness or 
appropriateness of many of the policies that the USFS or other fire agencies use to 
contain that problem. Validating the intelligence provided by life science experts with 
fire service professionals can help with the inconstancies in policy. 
Some prevention policies conflict with what research and science indicate may be 
most useful in protecting life, property, and the environment. Sabrina Drill examines 
several myths focused on wildfire resistance and environmental health. She argues that 
environmentally sound preventative actions, such as drought-tolerant landscaping may 
conflict with the belief that fire safe landscaping requires significant amounts of water.32 
Another myth identified by Drill supports Halsey’s contention that it is false to believe 
that California native plants require regular burning to maintain health.33 Instead, she 
argues for funding and policies that would bridge the gap between life science and social 
science through the regulation or support of homeowners in hardening their homes with a 
primary focus on effective vegetation and landscape management.34 Another perspective 
concentrates on the concept of letting current fires burn to minimize or prevent future 
events, although not to the point where life safety is an immediate threat. Similarly, 
researchers Ingalsbee and Raja call for “ecological fire use, [focused on] working with 
wildland fire rather than fighting against them.”35 The authors characterize the wildland 
fire problem as being socioenvironmental, which is a combination of some of the societal 
and environmental topics previously discussed. The researchers argue that the wildfire 
problem results from three compounding factors: fuel accumulation from historical fire 
suppression activities, global warming, and consistent residential growth in the urban-
wildland interface.36 Each of these issues independently creates the need for extensive 
policy evaluation and development. 
                                                 
32 Sabrina Drill, “Achieving Wildfire Resistance and Environmental Health in the Wildland-Urban 
Interface,” Fremontia: A Journal of the California Native Plant Society 38, no. 2 (July 2010): 37–42. 
33 Drill, 37.  
34 Drill, 39. 
35 Timothy Ingalsbee and Urooj Raja, “The Rising Costs of Wildfire Suppression and the Case for 
Ecological Fire Use,” in The Ecological Importance of Mixed-Severity Fires: Nature’s Phoenix, ed. 
Dominick A. DellaSala and Chad T. Hanson (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015), 367.  
36 Ingalsbee and Raja, 353–5. 
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B. FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE 
The concept of fire service intelligence continues to evolve with the needs of 
society and public safety agencies. The intelligence operations take place at the larger 
national level and are reinforced at the regional level. Both levels improve situational 
awareness for first responders.  
1. National Level 
Although fire services have not adopted a formalized intelligence cycle approach, 
recent advances have been made in information sharing. Before September 11, 2001 
(9/11), the term “all-hazards” intelligence did not exist, nor did the concept of fire service 
involvement in the intelligence process. Much has changed since then; the U.S. 
government and the fire service have increasingly embraced the idea of information 
sharing and dissemination. In the years following 9/11, the Fire Department of the City of 
New York (FDNY) was instrumental in this change. In 2007, the FDNY developed a 
terrorism and disaster preparedness strategy that included the fire services’ first 
consideration of information-sharing, which included timely intelligence and information 
dissemination to enhance situational awareness for the fire service.37 One of the pillars of 
this strategy was the creation of the weekly intelligence product Watchline, which 
provides recent incident reports, threat evaluations, and intelligence assessments focused 
on firefighters as the end user. This intelligence product has been in use for nearly a 
decade and provides timely information to approximately 40,000 response personnel 
weekly.38 While Watchline is not considered a tactical intelligence product it is useful for 
situational awareness. 
In addition to the local New York efforts to improve interagency communication 
post-9/11, the 9/11 Commission Report provided recommendations at a national level. In 
response to the report, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
                                                 
37 Michael R. Bloomberg, Nicholas Scoppetta, and Salvatore J. Cassano, Fire Department City of New 
York, Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy (New York: Fire Department of the City of New 
York, 2007), 20, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/events/2007/tdps/terrorism%20strategy_complete.pdf. 
38 Michael R. Bloomberg, Salvatore J. Cassano, and Edward S. Kilduff, FDNY New York 
Counterterrorism and Risk Management Strategy (New York: Fire Department of the City of New York, 
2011), 10, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/fdny/downloads/pdf/FDNY_ct_strategy_2011_12.pdf. 
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(ITACG) was established by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to improve 
information sharing throughout public safety disciplines. In 2013, ITACG was replaced 
by the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) to “improve information sharing 
and enhance public safety” through collaboration with multidisciplinary stakeholders.39 
The ITACG, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) collaboratively produced the intelligence product Roll Call Release that 
provides timely and relevant information to first responders. Additionally, the multi-
disciplinary 37 agencies represented at JCAT produce 50,000 print copies of the 
Intelligence Guide for First Responders as a primer for intelligence-related topics and is 
readily available on multiple sites online.40 First responders also have online access to 
the guide. The Guide was first produced in 2011 and updated in 2015. It is unknown what 
the readership is for the estimated 1,160,000 professional and volunteer firefighters in the 
United States.41 The Guide is a tool for public safety agencies to recognize and report 
suspicious activity or respond to and mitigate incidents after they have occurred.  
The desire for fire integration with the intelligence community remains a focus at 
the national level. In a 2017 testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communication, Fire Chief 
John Sinclair, President of International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) identified 
recommendations that included an enduring need for information sharing. Sinclair’s 
testimony also argued for continued support for the current network of intelligence fusion 
centers. He also shared the desire to receive actionable intelligence that assists in tactical 
and procedural decision making to best protect lives and property.42 He suggested that 
                                                 
39 “Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT),” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
accessed June 15, 2016, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-how-we-work/joint-ct-assessment-team. 
40 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, JCAT Intelligence Guide for First Responders 
(Washington, DC: National Counterterrorism Center, 2015), https://www.nctc.gov/jcat/docs/Intelligence_ 
Guide_for_First_Responders.pdf. 
41 “U.S. Fire Department Profile,” National Fire Protection Association, 2015, http://www.nfpa.org/ 
news-and-research/fire-statistics-and-reports/fire-statistics/the-fire-service/administration/us-fire-
department-profile. 
42 International Association of Fire Chiefs, The Future of FEMA: Stakeholder Recommendations for 
the Next Administrator (Fairfax, VA: International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2017), 3, http://docs.house. 
gov/meetings/HM/HM12/20170214/105563/HHRG-115-HM12-Wstate-SinclairJ-20170214.pdf. 
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the fire service can contribute to counterterrorism efforts as intelligence collectors and 
intelligence consumers. Equally import, intelligence can be enhanced when the fire 
service develops of community networks and proactively engages these networks through 
planning, preparation, and education.43 
2. Regional 
Although no research has been conducted on the effectiveness of the intelligence 
cycle for wildland firefighting, fire service professionals do make ample use of 
intelligence and information gathering and dissemination systems, particularly at the 
regional level. This section first reviews the current literature on one of the most 
prominent regional fire service intelligence systems, the Geographic Area Coordination 
Centers (GACCs), which disseminate fire intelligence on a regional basis. Next, this 
section reviews the national network of fusion centers, which is a network of state and 
local intelligence centers established after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Both systems are 
designed to deploy relevant intelligence to stakeholders; the GACCs are more single 
focused and wildland fire-centric while the national network of fusion centers is 
frequently characterized as “all-risk” or “all hazard.” Most fusion centers do not focus on 
any one type of hazard; instead, they are interested in all public safety threats, including 
terrorism. The current processes in place for intelligence product distribution and 
alternatives that may be feasible are discussed.  
The GACCs are overseen by the USFS, the DOI, the United States National Park 
Service (NPS), the United States Fish & Wildlife Service, and the United States Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM). The 10 regional GACCs service areas are Alaska, Eastern 
Area, Great Basin, Northern California, Northern Rockies, Northwest, Rocky Mountains, 
Southern Area, Southern California, and the Southwest (Figure 1). These GACCs provide 
                                                 
43 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism 
(New York: Manhattan Institute, 2008), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/firefighters-developing-
role-counterterrorism-5955.html. 
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a geospatial-centered view of the wildland fire threats by dividing the country into the 
specific regions.44  
 
Figure 1.  Geographic Area Coordination Centers.45 
One of the GACC’s primary missions is to develop predictive intelligence 
products that provide decision support information to help agencies act proactively in the 
prevention of fires. The Predictive Services section at the GACCs consists of three 
primary functional areas—weather, fire danger, and fuel conditions—and focus on 
intelligence and analytic outlook products. Predictive Services function under the 
guidance of the National Predictive Services Subcommittee (NPSS), which is chartered 
under the National Wildland Coordinating Group (NWCG) to “provide leadership and 
direction for the program with the goal to promote safe, efficient and cost-effective fire 
                                                 
44 Thomas W. Corringham, Anthony L. Westerling, and Barbara J. Morehouse, “Exploring Use of 
Climate Information in Wildland Fire Management: A Decision Calendar Study,” Journal of Forestry 106, 
no. 2 (2008): 71–77.  
45 Source: “About Us,” Geographic Area Coordination Centers, accessed October 4, 2016, http://gacc. 
nifc.gov/admin/about_us/about_us.htm. 
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management practices.”46 Intelligence and predictive services-related products are to be 
used by the greater wildland firefighting community for wildland fire and incident 
management decision making at the regional level. 
Much of Predictive Services intelligence results from the national fire danger 
rating system (NFDRS), a system that culminated from nearly a century of theoretical, 
experimental, and applied wildland fire science.47 The scientific basis of this type of 
early warning takes numerous collection types into account and produces actionable 
intelligence for fire incidents. 
At the core of the NFDRS is a computational process that inputs fuels, 
weather and topographic variables and outputs a suite of related indices 
that reflect the potential for a fire to ignite, spread and resist control. 
Rather than providing site-specific fire behavior predictions, the NFDRS 
is designed to provide indices that indicate the worst-case burning 
conditions averaged across large fire danger rating areas.48  
Focusing on large fire danger rating areas leaves vulnerabilities when attempting to 
provide actionable intelligence to targeted communities at risk. The large area focus 
considers entire portions of a state or county that lacks the needed attention to specific 
neighborhoods or individual streets.  
The available research information about GACCs focuses on organizational 
capabilities and service delivery. No identified literature indicates the GACC system 
utilizes the intelligence cycle, and little evaluative research has been done to measure the 
effectiveness of GACCs. In Climate in Context: Science and Society Partnering for 
Adaptation, Parris and others identified past and future areas of improvement for 
predictive services. As early as 2000, an “information push” was targeted at identifying 
shortcomings in wildland fire predictive services.49 A byproduct of these actions 
                                                 
46 “Welcome to the National Interagency Coordination Center,” National Interagency Coordination 
Center, accessed October 13, 2016, https://www.nifc.gov/nicc/index.htm.  
47 Patrick H. Freeborn, Mark A. Cochrane, and William Matthew Jolly, “Relationships between Fire 
Danger and the Daily Number and Daily Growth of Active Incidents Burning in the Northern Rocky 
Mountains, USA,” International Journal of Wildland Fire 24, no. 7 (2015): 900.  
48 Freeborn, Jolly, and Cochrane, 900. 
49 Adam S. Parris et al., ed. Climate in Context: Science and Society Partnering for Adaptation 
(Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 149.  
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included increased staffing at the GACCs and the creation of enhanced intelligence 
products, such as daily situation reports, and monthly or seasonal outlooks. The authors 
suggest that the GACCs are a “gap bridging solution that verifies quantitative inputs to 
the [climate] outlooks thus creating actionable intelligence products.50 The GACCs are 
working to improve communication to determine whether predictive service products are 
meeting the needs of fire service leadership.  
The national network of fusion centers has also moved toward improved 
intelligence messaging. Several years ago, the Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative recommended fire service integration into fusion centers.51 Existing literature 
indicates that the focus of fusion centers on wildland firefighting is very restricted even 
though proponents of fire service integration see overall value in the concept.52 Adding a 
wildland fire component to the fire service integration at fusion centers can enhance 
overall life safety for the major urban areas serviced by the centers. The National Fusion 
Center Association has emphasized the need to integrate the fire service in the multi-
disciplinary approach to national security:  
The vision of the National Network of Fusion Centers is to be a 
multidisciplinary, all-crimes, all-threats, all-hazards information sharing 
network that protects our nation’s security and the privacy, civil rights, 
and civil liberties of our citizens.53  
Improving information-sharing initiatives by linking the thousands of federal, state, and 
local public safety agencies is a crucial component of the National Strategy for the 
National Network of Fusion Centers.54 
                                                 
50 Parris et al., 160. 
51 Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, and Department of Homeland 
Security, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State 
and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
52 Department of Justice. 
53 National Fusion Center Association, 2014–2017 National Strategy for the National Network of 
Fusion Centers (Arlington, VA: National Fusion Center Association, 2014), 7, https://nfcausa.org/html/ 
National%20Strategy%20for%20the%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers.pdf. 
54 National Fusion Center Association, iv. 
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Some of the national level changes involving the integration of fusion centers 
have been linked to presidential strategies. For example, as early as 2007, President Bush 
identified the desire to create fusion centers and stated that “the threats to our national 
security are constantly evolving, so our policies to ensure this information is used and 
protected as intended must evolve as well.”55 The historic creation of the fusion centers 
provides a springboard for homeland security intelligence evolution. In a 2012 
investigative report, Senator Carl Levin stated, “Fusion centers may provide valuable 
services in fields other than terrorism, such as contributions to traditional criminal 
investigations, public safety, or disaster response and recovery efforts.”56 In as early as 
2008, John Rollins indicated that less than 15 percent of fusion centers exclusively self-
identify as counterterrorist centric.57 The remainder of the fusion centers focused on an 
“all-crime” or “all-hazard” approach.  
Not all experts share the same views regarding the value of integrated fusion 
centers. Monahan and Palmer disagree with the all-hazard concept of fusion centers. 
They contend that the concept moves away from the core focus of counter-terrorism and 
results in a weakening of centers’ ability to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.58 
Vanderbilt University Professor Manahan also opines the counterterrorism expansion to 
all-hazards is primarily to justify the fusion centers’ existence in the face of increased 
irrelevance.59 Despite some experts’ dismissal of the value of all-hazard fusion centers, 
the size and geographic reach of the national network of fusion centers has not been 
altered. With an existing network of 79 fusion centers nationwide, the ability to 
institutionalize change is improving. More significant numbers of fusion centers are 
                                                 
55 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf. 
56 U.S. Senate, Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers (Washington 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2012). 
57 John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, CRS Order Code RL34070 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008). 
58 Torin Monahan and Neal A. Palmer, “The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers,” Security 
Dialog 40, no. 6 (2009): 617–636. 
59 Torin Monahan, “The Murky World of ‘Fusion Centers’ Torin Monahan Critiques the Emergence 
of Data-Sharing ‘Fusion Centers’ Intended to Reduce Crime and Prevent Terrorism,” Criminal Justice 
Matters 75, no. 1 (2009): 21.  
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supporting fire service integration. Of the 79 fusion centers, fire service involvement is 
variable (Table 1). 
Table 1.   Fire Service Fusion Center Roles.60 
Number of 
fusion centers 
Fusion center role 
79 Total fusion centers 
46 Fire service identified as a specific mission area 
52 Fire service participation in liaison programs  
39 Fire service participation in governance 
 
No apparent reason has been advanced as to why some centers choose to have fire service 
involvement. Participation in the fusion center governance process is likely a contributing 
factor to the level of involvement.  
One example of the effective integration of fire and other services into an all-
hazard fusion center involved Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The New Jersey fusion center, 
the Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC), supported the needs of the 
public, as well as public safety agencies by providing real-time situational updates to a 
wide variety of customers before, during, and after the storm.61 The ability to provide 
intelligence to a variety of stakeholders is an example of the all-hazards approach. The 
ROIC handling of Hurricane Sandy emphasizes the need for the fusion center network to 
continue to evolve and possibly include wildland fire threat, and this thesis provides the 
first examination of that idea.  
C. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
This section provides an overview of the intelligence cycle and how the U.S. 
intelligence community uses it. The final output of the intelligence cycle is finished 
                                                 
60 Department of Homeland Security, 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 10, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/2014%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers%20Final%20Report_1.pdf. 
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intelligence. Mark Lowenthal, former Director of Analysis and Production at the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and recognized national security affairs expert, provides a 
sound basis for understanding when he stated, “Intelligence is a subset of the broader 
category of information.”62 Lowenthal further provides clarification by explaining that 
intelligence is a subset of specialized information derived from a process designed to 
meet the needs of policymakers. Specifically, the Iowa Department of Public Safety 
defines criminal intelligence in a more detailed way and outlines how it relates to the 
intelligence cycle. 
The intelligence cycle, as it pertains to criminal intelligence, is the process 
of developing raw information into finished intelligence for consumers, 
including policymakers, law enforcement executives, investigators, and 
patrol officers. These consumers then use this finished intelligence for 
decision-making and action. Intelligence may be used, for example, to 
further an ongoing investigation, or to plan the allocation of resources.63 
Although the definition pertains to criminal intelligence, the general understanding can 
apply to other types of intelligence by slightly altering the specific language.  
1. Intelligence Cycle Models 
Providing a general overview of the intelligence cycle is not a simple task. The 
literature indicates debates have occurred about how to describe it and its origination 
best. It is possible to link the beginnings of the intelligence cycle to the nation’s post-
World War II desire to evade strategic surprises foreign countries. The National Security 
Act of 1947 resulted in the creation the CIA led by the Director of Central Intelligence.64 
Early information about the intelligence cycle appeared in military-focused literature in 
the late 1940s. The 1948 military manual Intelligence for Commanders defined the 
significant features of intelligence gathering (Figure 2), which is believed to be one of the 
first versions of the intelligence cycle. Similarities in the core components, such as 
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direction, collection, and processing of this first version of the intelligence cycle are 
evident in later iterations that were adopted by numerous intelligence agencies.  
 
Figure 2.  Early Intelligence Cycle.65 
Over the ensuing years, the process of intelligence analysis evolved to include 
multiple agencies. Including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 
the intelligence community has 17 members.66 As the intelligence community grew, so 
did the needs of the participating agencies. Variations to the intelligence cycle models are 
the bi-product of agency-specific interpretations and needs. Some of the differences are 
subtle with the addition or elimination of a single phase of the cycle, while others like the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence add an evaluation and 
feedback phase that is in place throughout the process.67 The FBI intelligence cycle 
                                                 
65 Source: Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders (Harrisburg, PA: 
The Military Service Publishing Company, 1948), 5. 
66 “Member Agencies,” United States Intelligence Community, accessed January 9, 2017, https:// 
www.intelligencecareers.gov/icmembers.html. 
67 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2.0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2013), I–6, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf. 
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consists of six steps that include the identified requirements (of the intelligence), 
planning-direction, collection, processing-exploitation, analysis-production and 
dissemination (Figure 3).68 Although the FBI cycle has some common elements of the 
post-World War II military version, it has evolved to center on collaboration, a 
component completely missing in the first model of the cycle.  
 
Figure 3.  FBI Intelligence Cycle.69 
The USMC model provides a comparative example (Figure 4). The 
“requirements” phase is absent, and the cycle ends with the “utilization” phase.70 In the 
USMC’s warfighting publication, Intelligence Operations, a comprehensive statement 
regarding the intelligence cycle says: 
                                                 
68 “Intelligence Branch,” Federal Bureau of Investigations, accessed October 8, 2016, https://www. 
fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/intelligence-branch. 
69 Source: Federal Bureau of Investigations. 
70 Department of the Navy, Intelligence Operations, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 
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No single phase of the cycle is more important than the others. All of the 
phases are interdependent. Without proper direction, the other phases will 
not focus on the correct objectives. Without effective collection, there may 
be too much or too little information and what information there is may 
prove to be irrelevant. Without processing and production, there is a mass 
of random data instead of the knowledge needed for the planning and 
execution of operations. Intelligence is meaningless unless it reaches the 
right people in time to affect the decision-making process and in an 
understandable form.71 
 
Figure 4.  USMC Intelligence Cycle.72 
The addition of the utilization phase of the USMC model is to support the finished 
intelligence being put into action following the dissemination.  
The CIA intelligence cycle (Figure 5) depicts a version that has fewer steps than 
those of the FBI and USMC. The traditional CIA intelligence cycle shows it as a 
recurring process made up of five parts as follows:  
• Planning and direction encompass the management of the entire effort and 
involve determining collection requirements based on customer requests. 
                                                 
71 Department of Navy, 3–1. 
72 Source: Department of Navy, 3–1. 
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• Collection refers to the gathering of raw data to meet the collection 
requirements. These data can be derived from any number and type of 
open and secret sources. 
• Processing refers to the conversion of raw data into a format that CIA 
analysts can use.  
• Analysis and production describe the process of evaluating data for 
reliability, validity, and relevance, integrating and analyzing it, and 
converting the product of this effort into a meaningful whole, which 
includes assessments of events and implications of the information 
collected.  
• Finally, the product is disseminated to its intended audience.73  
 
Figure 5.  The CIA Intelligence Cycle.74 
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(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 45–46. 
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The CIA model has been in use for decades. In Analyzing Intelligence, former 
CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr provides an overview of agency analysis related to the 
effectiveness of the agency’s intelligence cycle process occurring between 1950 and 
2000. Some key challenges related to intelligence were identified: preconceived mindsets 
of those requesting the intelligence, politicization, informational gaps, and the need for 
expertise building and warning challenges.75 The desire for early warning is a primary 
focus for the intelligence community to stop or minimize adverse incidents.  
Although no standardized version of the cycle accepted by all relevant agencies 
exists, the similarities among the intelligence process models indicate some consensus on 
aspects of the fundamental processes and components.  
2. Perspectives of the Intelligence Cycle  
Much of the literature on the intelligence cycle and its implementation 
concentrates on the policy perspective, as well as application and use, and general policy 
conservatism is an underlying theme in much of it. “There is much more emphasis on 
avoiding error than on imagining surprises.”76 This statement reflects the view that some 
analysts involved in the intelligence cycle are more focused on risk aversion.  
Dahl characterizes the discussion of the intelligence process in his book, 
Intelligence and Surprise Attack, in which he identifies three broad schools of thought on 
intelligence: the traditionalist, reformist, and contrarian. These categories serve as a basis 
for evaluating literature related to the subject of intelligence and the intelligence cycle.77 
Dahl also provides another point of reference that further divides intelligence into 
strategic and tactical.78  
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The traditionalist views intelligence processes and the intelligence cycle 
application from more historical perspective. Although traditionalists have varied 
opinions, core concepts are generally agreed upon. Lowenthal examines the intelligence 
process and argues that the collecting intelligence from as many sources as possible 
creates synergy and a form of “all-source intelligence.”79 Lowenthal’s 36 years of 
experience as an intelligence practitioner, as well as a policy-level executive in various 
branches of the government, provides credibility to his ideas.  
From a reformist view, or “how it can be made better” view, Mark Phythian, 
Professor of International Security, and author of several books on intelligence theory, 
provides insight into the future of the intelligence cycle. He suggests that it is necessary 
to connect academic theory and experience to understand the intelligence cycle 
thoroughly. In his view, an academic understanding of the cycle has limitations that can 
be enhanced by a practitioner perspective. Phythian and the contributors in 
Understanding the Intelligence Cycle describe the cycle in various forms and 
configurations, and continually critically evaluating the intelligence cycle is the theme 
that resonates throughout the text with the goal of providing new ideas and 
representations of the traditional cycle.80 Similarly, Transforming U.S. Intelligence has a 
reformist slant, as it focuses on “identifying transformative solutions that combine 
technology with creative tactics and strategies so exponential growth in capabilities might 
be possible.”81 This text is different from Phythian’s in that it is heavily focused on 
technological evolution and the role in future intelligence endeavors.  
In Intelligence Analysis, A Target-Centric Approach, Clark provides a non-linear 
alternative to the intelligence cycle.82 The target-centric approach does not describe the 
intelligence cycle as one that is simple or linear; it is a network that contains numerous 
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feedback loops.83 These feedback loops provide a constant evaluation of the process. 
Additionally, Clark describes an objective-oriented view of a problem that creates a 
shared pictured for all stakeholders in the process rather than a directed or planned 
intelligence product need found in the intelligence cycle. The reformist point of reference 
is focused on process innovation and enhancement. 
The contrarian position has a fundamentally negative focus, which is based on 
perceived intelligence failures. This viewpoint provides balance to the more positive 
nature of the traditionalist perspective. Zegart identifies multiple concerns with the failure 
of the intelligence process. She argues that when analyzing foreign policy and cold war 
ideology, several issues emerge that provide evidence to support a counter-argument to 
the effectiveness of the intelligence process over the last 50 years. Zegart suggests that 
culture is a fundamental component of the problem, which is reflected in the statement, 
“Culture has an invisible but powerful hold, coloring how intelligence officials view the 
world and their role in it.”84 Much of this perspective is based on the belief that the 
intelligence process is biased and singled minded.  
A hybrid of the contrarian and reformist perspectives is found in the CIA report 
Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community, which also brings a social science 
analysis of the intelligence cycle. The author, Rob Johnston, who specializes in cultural 
anthropology, indicates that the conventional intelligence cycle model does not consider 
the myriad of tasks and complexity facing intelligence analysts, which renders it less than 
optimally effective and in need of rethinking.85 One key recommendation offered is that 
the entire traditional intelligence cycle model should be revisited and redesigned to 
consider its overarching intended goal more accurately. What that redesign looks like was 
not explicitly defined, but was merely a recommendation. 
A review of the literature indicates no explicit consensus regarding whether the 
intelligence cycle is useful actually exists. However, the foundational theories and their 
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models of the intelligence cycle exist in much of the literature with subtle variations in 
specific designs of the cycle. The range of opinions expressed by practitioners and SMEs 
all add to the complexity of the debate. Despite the lack of a defined agreement among 
those experts in the intelligence field or researchers who study the intelligence cycle, its 
use does seem to have value, which indicates the need to further evaluate the usefulness 
of use for the wildland fire problem. The CIA intelligence cycle model is further 
evaluated for wildland fire application in Chapter IV due to the simplicity of the steps.  
D. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AND WILDLAND FIRES 
No specific literature exists on the link between the intelligence cycle and 
management and prevention of wildland fires. This thesis focuses on applying the 
established intelligence cycle to the wildland fire problem, which is based in part on two 
previous Naval Postgraduate School theses that examine the concept of connecting the 
intelligence process to disciplines outside of the traditional criminal intelligence field. 
Specifically, Schultz, an emergency manager, identified the need for improved 
intelligence processing and developed an emergency management centric intelligence 
model.86 Stokes, a senior DHS intelligence officer, examined the intelligence process 
model, and proposed and analyzed its application to the homeland security enterprise in 
its entirety.87 These sources engaged in literature research similar to the review 
conducted in the current thesis, which both focus on the non-traditional intelligence cycle 
application.  
Schulz’s and Stokes’s independent concentration on alternate applications of the 
cycle resonates well with evaluating new ways to address the wildland fire problem. Both 
authors work in disciplines outside the intelligence community, which is similar to 
wildland firefighting. Institutionalizing the intelligence cycle process in non-law 
enforcement-centric disciplines could be advantageous in a variety of disasters.88 For 
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example, Schultz suggested developing an emergency management intelligence cycle. 
This thesis indicates how the writings of Schulz and Stoke provide groundwork that 
focused on emergency management that can be expanded upon to develop new ways to 
consider the intelligence cycle in relation to wildland fires.  
Disaster studies were also reviewed in the current thesis because they provide a 
comparison between intelligence concepts and other applications. In support of this 
concept, the National Response Framework (NRF) articulates an all-hazards approach to 
homeland security regardless of the type, origin, or magnitude of major disasters or 
emergencies, including disastrous wildland fires.89 The NRF directs much of the 
response and recovery actions to significant disasters that involve a total of 14 core 
capabilities consisting of a range of processes key to managing and preventing disasters. 
Of these 14 core capabilities, planning and public information and warning directly 
correlate with the intelligence cycle and its potential role in wildfire management and 
response.  
Core Capability 1—Planning  
Objective: Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community, 
as appropriate, in the development of executable strategic, operational, 
and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.90 
 
Core Capability 2—Public Information and Warning 
Objective: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable 
information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, 
accessible, and culturally linguistically appropriate methods to effectively 
relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the 
actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.91  
The identified core capabilities are analogous to the planning and the 
dissemination phases of the intelligence cycle. The planning component is similar to the 
starting point, and the dissemination phase aligns with the public information and 
warning core capability as the ending or dissemination phase of the intelligence cycle.  
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As emergency management continues to evolve at the national level, improved 
specificity regarding how to prevent and manage emergencies and the establishment of 
related policies is evident. Policies, such as the NRF, provide the necessary basis to deal 
with a broad spectrum of incidents in part because each disaster requires a clear response, 
management strategy, and assistance plan based on the scale and complexity of the 
event.92 When evaluating the impact of disasters, including wildland fires, the 
significance of the impact may trigger policy change. This policy change is reactive to 
respond to errors or shortcomings.  
Not all experts believe that policy changes resulting from the analysis of events 
are useful or constructive. In Lessons of Disaster, Birkland indicates that policy change 
does not always yield the desired result and cites the 9/11 attacks as an example. 
Following that event, an assumption was that the management of all disasters and 
terrorism is the same, and independent policy was unnecessary.93 An example of that 
assumption is that managing a commercial jet crashing into a 100-story high-rise building 
is the same as managing a magnitude 6.7 earthquake in downtown Los Angeles. Birkland 
also contends that Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) merge with the 
DHS possibly led to the later realized shortcomings during disasters, such as Hurricane 
Katrina, due to the dilution of the identified role and responsibilities.94 Evaluating the 
linkage between homeland security and emergency management may be helpful to apply 
the intelligence cycle model to wildland fires. This application can be based on the core 
concepts of the intelligence cycle and align it with core disaster policies, such as the 
NRF. Although minimal scholarly work is available that considers that relationship, the 
following chapters explore and evaluate it.  
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E. SUMMARY 
The study of and practical concerns about the wildland fire problem originate 
from a number of perspectives that range from the narrow and common focus of physical 
sciences on the structural ignition problem to life sciences, which tend to fixate on 
ecosystem studies and climatology. Both fields of science can be coupled with social 
sciences to consider the human interaction component of the wildland fire problem. 
These perspectives ultimately drive much of the policy focused on wildland fires despite 
their disparate views and corresponding recommendations. This literature review 
identified themes of consensus and debate related to the wildland fire problem, and 
despite silos and differing views, all scholars and expert practitioners agree that the 
wildland fire problem is significant and requires action. An analysis of existing research 
revealed that policy perspectives, such those related to how to best prevent or minimize 
wildland fire impacts, do not always align with life, environmental, or social sciences’ 
views or what is known about fire science.  
The second section of the literature review examined two intelligence 
dissemination platforms, the wildfire centric GACCs and the all-risk or all-hazard 
focused national network of fusion centers. During the search for studies and data on the 
GACCs, limited evaluative documents were discovered and available for review. 
However, studies and documents focused on the broader evaluation of fusion centers 
were available and discussed. The determination of a “best practice” intelligence product 
dissemination platform will require further analysis. It appears that linking the GACCs 
and the national network of fusion centers may be critical in supporting wildland 
firefighting activities from the fire prevention level all the way down to the tactical level. 
At a minimum, the SMEs assigned to the GACCs can provide analytical support to the 
centers. Optimal interaction can occur by embedding wildland intelligence analysts at 
fusion centers that have wildland fires in their threat profile.95  
The final section of the literature review examined intelligence and the 
intelligence cycle. Perspectives on intelligence and the intelligence cycle indicate that 
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some common beliefs, as well as divergent opinions, are held; e.g., some practitioners 
contend that a need exists for alteration and updating the current intelligence process 
model due to obsolescence. The core information gathered in this literature review is 
elaborated upon in Chapter III, which further evaluates fire service intelligence 
collection. The components of the intelligence cycle and research that attempts to 
establish critical linkages between the cycle and the wildland fire problem exist in 
Chapter IV. Lastly, the findings of the literature review are applied in Chapter V and 
provide a framework for examining a case study of the Waldo Canyon fire.  
This literature review has demonstrated a gap in research and thinking about the 
application of the intelligence cycle to wildland firefighting. Little or no discussion has 
appeared in the firefighting literature about the use of the intelligence cycle or other 
intelligence principles. The following chapters build on this review to incorporate two 
seemingly unrelated topics into the research question posed earlier: How might the 
framework of the intelligence cycle be used to prevent devastating WUI fires?  
 36 
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III. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRE 
SERVICE 
This chapter examines current practices of intelligence collection used to support 
fire service in the prevention and management of wildfires. A broad spectrum of 
intelligence types is used by the fire service that originates from several collection 
methodologies. These methodologies can be divided into five primary intelligence (INT) 
collection types. This chapter describes them and how they are used by various end users 
while evaluating their effectiveness in preventing and managing fires. The current use of 
technology and its integration with other types of intelligence collection sources are 
discussed to provide a comprehensive perspective of variations in wildland fire 
intelligence practices.  
A. FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE 
The concept of fire service intelligence is not new and exists in a variety of ways. 
Daily and weekly bulletins are commonly used to provide a view of what is happening in 
real time. The bulletins report on several types of intelligence that fall into four distinct, 
but related categories: 
• Estimative intelligence: Information used by the fire service about 
potential threats of fire.  
• Warning intelligence: This category involves critical notifications 
provided to policymakers, agencies, and citizens that a threat is very 
likely.96 A prime example of warning intelligence is a red flag warning, 
which is intended to provide early notification of dangerous fire weather. 
The National Weather Service (NWS) issues red flag warnings for 24-hour 
periods and can last for several days.97  
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• Research Intelligence: This type of intelligence involves a comprehensive 
assessment of an issue, often over an extended period. A bi-product of 
research intelligence is often accurate estimative intelligence.  
• Scientific and technical intelligence (S&T): Refers to detailed information 
from multiple sources typically integrated to generate a broader picture of 
the fire threat. For example, research intelligence may evaluate historical 
fire occurrences in a specific region, and that information is analyzed in 
relation to real-time technical weather data that results in the identification 
of fire threat. Generally, technical intelligence acquired from weather 
monitoring that often includes measures of relative humidity, wind speed, 
and fuel moisture aligns well to validate the importance of NWS red flag 
warnings. This thesis intends to demonstrate how scientific and technical 
intelligence attributes can be employed by the fire service. 
The outcomes of the intelligence process may provide specific, localized and 
situational awareness to first responders. Most commonly seen is warning intelligence 
that tells of a potential threat. The dissemination may also focus on citizens at a 
community level and result in evacuation orders. Frequently, the messaging derived from 
intelligence efforts involves illuminating a broad-spectrum threat picture for an entire 
region that includes areas the size of counties or even states. In developing these 
messages, strong relationships between the needs of the end user and those creating the 
information is important to accomplish the intended intelligence objectives.98 Once key 
intelligence information is generated, the consumer base can shift to include public, 
private, and governmental communities barring restrictions for any classified 
information.  
Some intelligence products are specifically designed to be useful to both fire 
service professionals and the community. One example is CAL FIRE’s very high fire 
hazard severity zone maps, which are intended to identify areas of more significant fire 
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risk. These maps are designed as a prevention tool for use before a fire occurs and serve 
as an example of research intelligence that integrates information on past fire history and 
current residential interface areas to generate wildland fire specific intelligence. These 
maps identify geographic areas that are at most risk from a fire due to proximity to 
wildland interface areas, vegetative fuel composition, and historic fire data (Figure 6).99  
 
Figure 6.  Fire Hazard Severity Zone Map.100 
This type of product is useful to fire service professionals and citizens alike to 
provide situational awareness that considers multiple factors, such as construction types, 
                                                 
99 “California Fire Hazard Severity Zone Map Update Project,” Cal Fire, 2012, http://www.fire.ca.gov/ 
fire_prevention/fire_prevention_wildland_zones_maps. 
100 Source: “Rancho Santa Margarita,” Cal Fire, 2011, http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire_prevention/fhsz_ 
maps/FHSZ/orange/c30_RanchoSantaMargarita_vhfhsz.pdf. 
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vegetative fuels types, and historic fire data. Combining the background information 
from these kinds of maps with upcoming weather alerts in the processing and analysis 
portion of an intelligence cycle can lead to more actionable intelligence that can directly 
improve outcomes in the future. Residents often are aware that they live in a threat area, 
and adding high-risk weather indicators into the equation, provides improved and more 
precise information about the threat. Ideally, homeowners would consider this type of 
intelligence when formulating a “Ready, Set, Go” action plan; being ready before a fire 
starts, being set as the fire approaches, and going early.101 The same information can 
assist fire service professionals in making better-informed decisions when wildland fires 
start.  
B. RELEVANCE OF THE INTS 
The fire service consumers’ unique intelligence needs currently serve as driving 
influences of the various collection categories. These INT collection sources can be 
broken down into five core groups that include: 
• Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT): Technically derived 
intelligence from various sensing instruments 
• Human intelligence (HUMINT): Intelligence gathered through 
interpersonal contact 
• Open source intelligence (OSINT): Intelligence gathered from publicly 
available sources 
• Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT): Intelligence gathered that relates to a 
particular location 
• Signals intelligence (SIGINT): Intelligence gathered from electronic 
signals and communications systems 
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These types of raw intelligence data are analyzed and ultimately disseminated to 
intelligence practitioners and analysts. Each of the five categories makes a specific and 
unique contribution to the different phases of wildland fire management with the goal of 
using data to minimize impacts before, during, and after a fire incident. Intelligence 
collection within these five categories occurs regularly; however, coordination between 
the stakeholders is not consistent, and the data they generate do not typically take place as 
part of an established intelligence model. An examination of the five collection categories 
establishes areas of current fire service use.  
The historical context of HUMINT includes espionage and elicitation, which is 
the gathering of information during a conversation between two or more people.102 
Wildland fire prevention activities regularly use HUMINT as a mechanism to evaluate 
threats, as reflected, for example, in situations when direct interaction occurs between fire 
service professionals and the residents in communities most threatened by wildland fires. 
HUMINT collection is limited by the number of fire agency personnel available to make 
direct physical contact. Given that an estimated 70,000 communities in the United States 
exist in the wildland-urban interface, the information collection that results from direct 
human interaction is overwhelming.103 Finding alternatives to address the HUMINT data 
collection needs from such significant numbers is necessary for the future.  
Another shortcoming of HUMINT is the subjectivity of the information gathered 
from personal interaction. The need to validate this human data with other information 
sources is often required. An example may be a fire inspector evaluating a wildland 
interface area would need to validate property ownership information gathered from a 
resident with maps or contracts. Regardless of the challenges associated with human data 
gathering, the opportunity for fire service officials to interact with citizens and key staff 
of other professional fields often fosters positive relationships that enhance 
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communication in the long run. Another positive result is that communities develop a 
strong sense that their safety and protection is a primary concern of the fire service.104 
GEOINT is the most frequently collected wildland fire data set, which may 
include imagery and mapping data of communities and other geographic areas. 
Commercial or governmental satellites, fixed wing or rotary aircraft, and unmanned 
aerial vehicles or drones collect the information. GEOINT is often synonymous with 
imagery intelligence (IMINT), which is basically overhead imagery (space-based, 
airborne) and is useful as a pre-planning tool before fires start. This preventative-focused 
imagery attempts to identify areas at risk to provide essential information for generating 
future programs to mitigate the associated risk. Equally valuable, once a wildfire starts, 
GEOINT can be a mechanism for monitoring current fire status and estimated 
communities and critical infrastructure at risk. This type of information often supports 
operational resource needs by determining access and optimal deployment locations. 
Layering other types of intelligence on top of a GEOINT framework as part of a fusion 
process is common, which often includes demographic information, such as census data, 
to determine the size of the population that is in harm’s way or that potentially needs 
evacuation. As an established collection mechanism, GEOINT positively supports 
wildland fire prevention and operational actions.  
MASINT analysis provides technical data that fall into several subcategories. The 
most pertinent to wildland fires are radar intelligence (RADINT), infrared intelligence 
(IRINT), and weather intelligence. RADINT is beneficial for visualization of a 
geographic area through smoke, haze, and foliage to try to detect and identify a targeted 
area of concern. IRINT is frequently used to determine areas of an active fire that require 
further resources to extinguish. Much like GEOINT, IRINT is captured by satellite, fixed 
wing, and rotary wing aircraft. The third example of MASINT is weather-related 
intelligence, which is one of the most significant sources utilized at the GACCs. A prime 
example of a MASINT intelligence product disseminated by the Predictive Services 
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Section at the GACC is the Monthly/Seasonal Outlook.105 The Monthly/Seasonal Outlook 
couples a regional geospatial view with weather discussions that include temperature and 
precipitation; both types of information are then linked to generate specific moisture 
measurements in living and dead wildland fire fuels. This predictive intelligence product 
establishes potential fire threats and risks for a defined region.  
OSINT involves the collection of information readily available to the public from 
sources, such as the internet, social media, broadcasts and print. Some of the other INTs 
are also open source data due to the broad availability on the internet. For example, some 
geographical and mapping information (GEOINT) is readily available on Google Earth. 
These OSINT images can be helpful in viewing WUI areas of a municipality. 
Not all the collection methods align with the traditional needs of the fire service; 
SIGINT is an example. The conventional perception of signals (SIGINT) is that it is a 
component of spying, which is obviously not a function of the fire service. SIGINT 
consists of collection of electronic signals from communications systems. Interception 
and exploitation of communications technologies are evolving to become a fire service 
need. An example where SIGINT may be of interest to fire services is related to 
international terrorist organizations’ threats to use fire as a weapon. FDNY Assistant 
Chief Joe Pfeifer recognizes the threat, “A full understanding of fire as a weapon and 
implications for response is essential for homeland security.”106 The threat is not merely 
that fire can serve as a general use weapon, but specifically, that fire can serve as a 
weapon in the wildland environment. The tactic of using fire as a weapon was employed 
in the Israeli forest in 2016, where more than 1,770 fires were extinguished over an eight-
day period.107 In the winter 2012 edition of Inspire, international terrorist organization al-
Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula provided a detailed account of how to best start an 
intentional wildland fire. Specific preoperational intelligence collection recommendations 
                                                 
105 Geographic Area Coordination Centers, Southern and Central CA Monthly/Seasonal Outlook—
OSCC, Riverside (Riverside, CA: Geographic Area Coordination Centers, 2018), https://gacc.nifc.gov/ 
oscc/predictive/outlooks/myfiles/assessment.pdf. 
106 Joseph W. Pfeifer, “Fire as a Weapon in Terrorist Attacks,” Combating Terrorism Center 6, no. 7 
(July 2013), https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/fire-as-a-weapon-in-terrorist-attacks. 
107 János Besenyő, “Inferno Terror: Forest Fires as the New Form of Terrorism,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence (2017): 5–7. 
 44 
in the magazine included choosing a dry season prone to strong winds, watching weather 
broadcasts to keep updated, and studying scientific magazines and the internet to learn 
the climate of target countries.108 Understanding the threat is perhaps the first step; taking 
action to gather preoperational intelligence through SIGINT is another.  
The goal of more efficiently using SIGINT data is to disrupt attacks before they 
occur through the interception of pre-operational communications, such as phone calls, 
texts, other forms of messaging, and monitoring of social networks. The fire service 
would not readily have access to this type of data collection. Established intelligence 
agencies like those found in the ODNI, which is well versed in this type of intelligence, 
would be responsible for these collection activities.  
Combining the multiple INTs as key elements of the processing step of the 
intelligence cycle allows for enhanced and more precise characterizations of potential or 
ongoing wildland fire threats. Well-established private sector vendors provide these data 
sets. One such company is used by much of the fire service, ESRI, which hosts 
interactive maps that include active or recent fires, burn perimeters, wind conditions, and 
rainfall.109 ESRI uses streaming data from multiple collection and diagnostic sources and 
combines the information to create maps. Another valuable component of the ESRI 
mapping is a data layer that captures public social media posts, such as Instagram, Flickr, 
Twitter, and YouTube that creates a blend of HUMINT and OSINT (Figure 7).110 The 
map also includes RADINT, which is displayed as a storm front, and IRINT, which is 
shown as red dots indicating “hot spots.” Both sources of intelligence collection are 
merged to create a more comprehensive understanding of the fire situation. 
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Figure 7.  U.S. Wildfire Activity Public Information Map.111 
A specific example of a comprehensive, high-level product is the FEMA Daily 
Operations Briefing.112 The Briefing provides a macro view of elevated fire weather, red 
flag warnings, and summaries of current wildfires and status of requested and declared 
FMAGs. This type of GEOINT and OSINT is primarily focused on situational awareness 
that is too broad in focus to make the intelligence actionable. The fire weather outlook 
map (Figure 8) found in the FEMA Briefing is an example of an intelligence product that 
lacks this specificity. Large areas at risk are shown without targeting specific geographic 
locations. Intelligence products, such as the Fire Weather Outlook, leave the end user 
needing additional information, such as the condition of fire receptive vegetation.  
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Figure 8.  Fire Weather Outlook.113 
The variable nature of the INTs provides for a synergy where the integrated and 
processed data points result in an ideal product that leads to the prevention or minimizing 
a fire’s impacts. Independently, the collection disciplines leave gaps in achieving the goal 
of minimizing risk, primarily because the sources do not integrate information well. 
Some experts contend that intelligence derived from multiple collection sources 
strengthens the products available for fire service response and prevention.114 One of the 
few examples of solid coordination of multiple collection sources is seen in extended fire 
behavior forecasts that focus on specific operational periods from one to three days. In 
this instance, historical wildland fire information sources, such as weather indices, 
geographic location, fuel types and fire modeling, are processed and analyzed to yield a 
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probability of ignition that is a form of early warning. Chapter IV elaborates on the value 
of systematically identifying and processing multiple fire intelligence sources through the 
intelligence cycle.  
C. TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTs 
Early detection of wildland fires has been an ongoing challenge, as it is common 
for wildland fires in remote areas to go unreported in the incipient stages. Delays in 
detection can lead to the rapid escalation of a fire and can also result in threats to life, 
property, and the environment that exponentially increase as fire size grows. As a given 
fire expands, fire suppression costs increase concurrently with the fire size. Technology is 
a solution that can help fire managers mitigate the impacts of wildland fires. 
Currently, satellite data provide valuable information that directly supports 
intelligence production for other fields. One such satellite, the Terra satellite, includes 
five different instruments that monitor a variety of global issues, and three of the five 
instruments are applicable to wildland fire intelligence collection: advanced spaceborne 
thermal emission and reflection radiometer (ASTER), multi-angle imaging 
spectroradiometer (MISR), and moderate resolution imaging spectroradiometer 
(MODIS).115 ASTER measures the electromagnetic spectrum, which is used to create 
detailed maps. MISR is useful in monitoring the smoke plumes from wildland fires and 
the associated atmospheric aerosol particles, whereas MODIS views the entire surface of 
the planet every couple of days and can locate active fires by measuring thermal 
anomalies.116 Monitoring burned areas for uncontained perimeters and hot spots is also 
valuable intelligence provided by MODIS. 
The Terra satellite is a useful tool for intelligence collection, as its nearly real-
time imagery provides a mechanism for early warning.117 Coupling this satellite data 
with other historical data sets provides a basis for intelligence analysis to create strategic 
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and tactical recommendations to decision makers. Once the FireSat is implemented, the 
collection system will be managed by scientists at National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). It is expected that NASA’s collection of highly technical and 
detailed data and its coordination with established dissemination networks will enhance 
fire service access to actionable information. 
A network of satellite-based sensors is only in the developmental stages for the 
fire service. The network identified as FireSat is the creation of NASA’s Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory and when completed, it will consist of over 200 thermal infrared imaging 
sensors.118 The project is getting closer to an initial operating capacity date of 2018.119 
The goal of the network is to provide rapid detection of relatively small fires by 
deploying an interconnected system of sensors. According to NASA, “Once operational, 
FireSat would represent a complete monitoring coverage of wildfires ever from 
space.”120 The FireSat network would augment the monitoring currently accomplished 
by the NASA Terra satellite, a broader technology currently used by the fire service and 
other fields. Unfortunately, the full FireSat deployment timeline has not been formalized, 
but NASA fully intends to implement the program.  
Another technological innovation that enhances intelligence gathering is the high-
performance wireless research and education (HPWREN) project that is only used in a 
portion of California. HPWREN is a project of the Applied Network Research group at 
the San Diego Supercomputer Center located at the University of California San Diego 
that began in 2000.121 It was designed around a wireless data network to support 
research, education, and public safety disciplines. The network serves the California 
geographic areas of San Diego, Imperial, and Riverside counties, which fall into the 
lower third of the state and includes primary backbone nodes designed to provide 
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connectivity in remote locations, which is helpful in providing relevant sensor 
information to fire officials.  
The design of the network is complex to meet the multiple needs of various end 
users. Information on real-time weather, fuel conditions, and camera images are provided 
and has been valuable before and during wildland fires. An example of specific data 
collected from one of the mountaintop monitoring locations includes anemometry (wind 
speed and direction), solar radiation, precipitation, relative humidity, barometric pressure, 
atmospheric temperature, fuel moisture, fuel temperature, and imagery captured from 
pan-tilt-zoom cameras. Based on input from fire agencies, real-time meteorological 
alarms send alerts when indices meet pre-established points. These data points are 
scientifically calculated highs and lows that have a direct correlation to new wildland fire 
starts and the associated exponential growth of the same fires. New relationships are 
being created to bring more stakeholders like Orange County, California into the 
network. The current performance will be further enhanced as the network grows to 
include more geographic areas and partner agencies and the data generated can be 
integrated with other data sources. Once the network design is complete, populations at 
risk from wildland fires can receive real-time actionable intelligence, and as the 
geographic footprint of HPWREN increases, so will the ability to limit wildland fire 
destruction through intelligence collection and analysis. 
Two countries have designed and launched innovative technology-based systems 
unavailable in the United States to support wildland fire intelligence. Canadian 
researchers developed the airborne wildland intelligence system (AWIS) that focuses on 
thermal infrared remote sensing and meets the need for intelligence collection during the 
night that is available before new incident operational periods. This system’s intelligence 
collection focuses on several primary issues that include hot spots, burned areas, water 
and saturation conditions, vegetative surface changes, fire suppression features, and 
interface structures.122 The benefit of this system is the data acquisition is occurring in 
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less active periods of the fire. Croatian researchers took a different approach when they 
developed ground-based automatic wildfire surveillance and monitoring network that has 
similarities to HPWREN. The project named Istria iForestFire Net is still in the 
developmental stages. iForestFire Net has the two primary goals of automatic early 
wildland fire detection and remote video fire monitoring that are in alignment with 
HPWREN. The Croatian study identified the types of high-tech sensors that would be 
especially useful to fire service, such as:  
• Video cameras sensitive in visible spectra; their detection is based on 
smoke recognition during the day and fire flame recognition during the 
night. 
• Infrared (IR) thermal imaging cameras that detect heat flux from the fire.  
• Optical spectrometry that identifies the spectral characteristics of smoke.  
• Light detection and ranging (LiDAR) systems that measure laser light 
backscattered by the smoke particles.  
• Radio-acoustic sounding systems for remote temperature measurements.  
• Acoustic volumetric scanners that recognize the fire acoustic emission 
spectrum  
• Sensor network-based systems, where some sensor nodes (in most cases 
wireless sensors) are deployed in the forest that measure different 
environmental variables used for fire detection.  
• Use of animals as mobile biological sensors equipped with sensor 
devices.123  
Currently, around the world, fire services do not integrate satellite data with 
information from ground-based networks, and ideally, they would be integrated through 
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the creation of a single network as another application of fusion. Independently, each of 
the technologies has a significant positive impact on wildland fire prevention and 
mitigation, but using them in a coordinated way would likely greatly increase the success 
of managing and preventing wildland fires. Experts have suggested that linking the 
critical concepts of sensor network data acquisition, information integration, and 
distribution is key to the success of the technology deployment.124 At present, the 
technical collection of information comes in many forms and is not managed by a single 
fire service agency, despite the indication from research findings that an aggregate 
collection of variable data sources compiled and posted in a single location may be highly 
beneficial. Some examples of this type of format include the National Interagency 
Wildfire Coordination Center and the NWS, which both use hyperlink information from 
internal and external sources. Merging satellite data and ground-based real-time remote 
sensor data with computational techniques can allow decision makers to forecast a fire’s 
rate of spread and make decisions based on the intelligence.125 This capability can 
significantly minimize fire impacts through early warning and incident planning. Further, 
the utilization of advanced technology in intelligence collection aligns well with the 
methodologies of the intelligence cycle, which are elaborated upon in the next chapter. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the role of intelligence and intelligence collection 
methods in the current wildland fire environment. HUMINT, MASINT, GEOINT, 
OSINT, and SIGINT all have a role in the wildland fire predictive processes, yet the fire 
service does not formally characterize the INTs as precursors to actionable intelligence. 
The robust nature of technology and its application to the wildland fire problem further 
supports the role of the INTs. Satellite, aerial and ground-based sensors alike provide 
valuable information to assist the intelligence cycle process, yet at the national level, 
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much of the innovative technology is not being currently used, and the full integration of 
data from multiple sources is often lacking. A few innovations were discussed that 
included promising technological systems being used in other countries. In the next 
chapter, the concepts of fire service intelligence, the intelligence collection types, and the 
technology component of intelligence collection as they relate to the CIA intelligence 
cycle are discussed.  
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IV. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE APPLICATION TO WILDLAND 
FIRES 
This chapter analyzes how the intelligence cycle may be applied to wildland fires 
and focuses on its potential effectiveness as a method that may enhance intelligence 
support. The discussion includes a strength and weakness examination of individual 
component phases of the CIA intelligence cycle and identifies how each relates to current 
and potential wildland fire use. In the traditional intelligence cycle, a strong desire exists 
to minimize single-minded thought processes commonly referred to as stovepipes. 
Intelligence analyst Robert Clark said, “The only product a stovepipe generates is 
smoke.”126 In that spirit, the exploration of the advantages that the multifaceted and 
widely encompassing processes inherent to the intelligence cycle may bring to the 
wildfire problem is evaluated. This chapter determines whether the application of the 
intelligence cycle can solve “all-hazard” problems and eliminate these types of 
stovepipes in the wildland fire arena. Chapter III showed that the fire service needs 
improved wildland fire intelligence; this chapter evaluates how the intelligence cycle may 
be able to improve performance in combating fires.  
A. CIA INTELLIGENCE CYCLE MODEL  
Multiple versions of the intelligence cycle have been in existence for 
approximately 70 years. As discussed in the literature review in Chapter II, experts have 
differing views about the intelligence cycle. Some practitioners question the cycle’s 
overall validity in the current era, whereas others find specific versions of it useful. 
Taking the basic concepts of the intelligence cycle found in the CIA model provides a 
reasonable starting point to determine the feasibility of application to the wildland fire 
problem. The CIA model is well-established and frequently referenced across several 
fields, which makes it worthwhile to consider. The nuances of the intelligence cycle have 
relevance across multiple disciplines; as one expert puts it, “Intelligence as a discipline 
commonly aligns with political science, international affairs, criminal justice, and 
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homeland security.”127 although wildland fires do not correspond with these identified 
applications, the evolving all risk nature of homeland security makes its value to the field 
important to consider. As with any process, the ability to add variation may enhance 
desired outcomes.  
For an adopted intelligence process to be effective, it has to be simple to explain, 
comprehend, and apply; if not, its implementation is likely to be ineffective, and the 
probability of resistance to its introduction can be high if fire service professionals do not 
see the value. The simplicity of the CIA intelligence cycle may increase the chances that 
it may be successful if adopted by the fire service. Still, the CIA model is not without its 
problems. A primary complaint is that agencies tend to hold onto sensitive information 
due to the secretive nature of the subjects. Fortunately, it is not a significant issue in the 
wildland fire realm, as the most crucial information is less often focused on individuals, 
such as terrorists, and the data used is almost exclusively open source or unclassified.  
The CIA’s model dictates that intelligence cycle steps proceed chronologically in 
an organized manner. In practice, however, this chronologic methodology can be limiting 
if the collected information is not updated continuously while working towards finished 
intelligence products. The cycle is basic enough that SMEs can efficiently develop oral 
and written products, such as bulletins and briefings.128 The goal of the intelligence 
attained is not to validate assumptions, but to empower decision makers.129 The logical 
assumption is that the finished product leads to end users making educated decisions, 
often in urgent situations.  
The desired outcome of the CIA intelligence cycle is accomplished through the 
collection of key information from INTs to prevent and minimize future or ongoing 
repercussions. By processing the information from the sources, data can be analyzed 
efficiently to produce actionable intelligence. The intelligence cycle is complete when the 
appropriate public and private sector entities acquire the finished intelligence. This type 
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of intelligence provides policymakers with estimative data that may require action, such 
as increased resource deployment. A broad objective of the cycle is to limit surprise 
because unexpected events and information can correlate with the dissemination of faulty 
intelligence regarding a possible threat.130 Former Director of the National Security 
Agency William Odom sums it up well, “dissemination is at root a communications 
issue.”131 As the final step of the intelligence cycle, effective dissemination is central in 
providing usable and accurate finished intelligence products. Getting the products to the 
rights decision makers promptly directly impacts implementation of the intelligence. The 
following discussion describes each phase of the intelligence cycle and how it currently 
or could potentially more effectively apply to the wildland fire problem. The strengths of 
each phase are identified, and exisiting areas of weakness are addressed to facilitate 
process improvement.  
1. Planning and Direction 
“Planning and direction is the management of the entire effort, from identifying 
the need for data to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. The whole process 
depends on guidance from public officials.”132 The planning component is the first step 
of the process that identifies the needs of the fire service customer. When the needs are 
strategic, the customer is commonly policymakers, such as fire chiefs; when the needs are 
more tactical, the customer is incident commanders. The planning component to 
minimize threat impacts commonly occurs in both the strategic and tactical firefighting 
environment.  
Correlations can be drawn between the planning and direction phase of the CIA 
intelligence cycle and the FEMA incident command system (ICS) planning process. In 
the FEMA model, planning involves situational evaluation, developing objectives, 
selecting strategies, and determining resource needs to meet the objectives.133 The 
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planning cycle is an example of an established tool in the ICS, which is a core component 
of FEMA training. The planning process commonly supported by planning “P” (Figure 9) 
is an incident command tool regularly applied to operational incident management and it 
similarly occurs in the planning and direction phase of the CIA intelligence cycle. In the 
fire service, intelligence needs are identified by fire service stakeholders who in turn 
assign resources and tasking to meet the intelligence needs. Once identified, these 
planning and direction requirements can occur repetitively. For example, regional fire 
service managers have predictive outlook needs provided continuously rather than as the 
result of specific requests. The constants used include daily outlooks, seven-day fire 
potential outlooks, and monthly outlooks that offer proactive intelligence in anticipating 
significant fire activity.  
 
Figure 9.  The Planning “P.”134 
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a.  Strengths  
Current fire service planning and direction practices will make it easy to adopt the 
CIA intelligence cycle model. The CIA model provides a starting point for the guiding 
framework of the intelligence cycle that is critical in all decision making, whether tactical 
or strategic. The CIA model requires defining the focus of the data analysis, which 
includes identifying the availability of resources required to complete the analysis, which 
occurs early in the cycle. Identifying local area relevance and context in the planning and 
direction phase also improves the focus of the intelligence. As a result of these actions, 
fire intelligence products, such as the NWS fire weather forecasts are consistently 
produced to meet the needs of regional and local fire service customers.  
b. Weaknesses  
Some shortcomings appear in the CIA model’s planning and direction phase as 
applied to wildland fires from a theoretic perspective. In theory, the CIA intelligence 
cycle begins at the planning and direction phase and follows a linear path to the 
completion of finished intelligence. Close adherence to the intelligence cycle can lead to 
flaws, such as the inability to adjust rapidly due to its step-by-step design. These 
deficiencies can present themselves when the planning and direction phase does not 
adequately identify the specific and full range of intelligence needs of the fire service. 
Deficits are evident when fire potential and risk information are not produced in 
synchrony, and the planning process does not recognize the local context of the 
intelligence beyond the core findings. The planning phase often defines what and where 
the fire problem exists, yet falls short of establishing why it is a problem, or more 
importantly, what can be done to mitigate the risk.  
A request from fire service officials may include fire-potential information that 
dictates preparedness levels without identifying the specific communities threatened; 
hence, the information provided is not detailed enough. Although it did not occur as an 
identified step of any intelligence cycle, some success has been made in planning and 
direction in the fire service. More can be done at a strategic planning level to drive the 
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intelligence towards more precise information on the what, where, and why of the 
wildland fire intelligence need.  
2. Collection 
“Collection is the gathering of the raw information needed to produce finished 
intelligence.”135 The fire service has not adopted the CIA intelligence cycle; however, 
collection is one of the more robust components that occurs in intelligence development. 
As referenced in Chapter III, the intelligence INTs appear in many different forms in the 
fire service, and the collection of information seems to be coordinated and systematic at 
local and regional levels.  
a.  Strengths  
An observed strength in the fire service data collection phase is the rapid 
evolution of technologically driven information sources. Much of the information 
collected comes in the form of sensor and scientific data, which results from the rapid 
development of technology in all aspects of daily life, including enhanced data collection 
from the sky and land. Leveraging updated technology in the collection phase of the 
intelligence cycle drives strategic understanding of the wildland fire problem through 
predictive analytics in the form of forecasts, warnings, and models.  
The goal of the collection phase is to gather as many relevant data points as 
possible while avoiding the attainment of unnecessary information. An example of when 
the collection phase effectively brings together multiple data points is the wildland fire 
decision support system’s (WFDSS’s) mapping, which involves several informational 
layers, each with several data types:  
• Base layers: topographic, Google Maps, Google Physical, U.S. states  
• Incident: planning areas, fire perimeters, management action points, points 
of interest, objective shapes, point of origin  
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• Analysis: ignitions, barriers, landscape masks, basic fire behavior, short 
term fire behavior, near term fire behavior, values at risk  
• Fire environment and safety: incidents (adjacent, within map view), active 
planning areas (adjacent), active MODIS 6, 12, and 24 hour and year to 
date  
• Estimated ground evacuation time, retardant avoidance, aquatic retardant 
avoidance  
• Disturbance history: fires in the current year, historical wildfires, fuel 
treatments 
• Fire weather and danger: significant fire potential, fire weather forecast 
zones, remote automated weather stations  
• Boundaries: jurisdictional agency, responsible agency, federal 
administrative areas, the nature conservancy lands, county lines, landscape 
source  
• Designated areas—wilderness, potential wilderness, special, other, BLM  
• Infrastructure-facilities, communication, energy, roads and trails  
• Natural and cultural resources: air quality, critical Habitats 
• Unit fire planning shapes—fire management units136 
b.  Weaknesses  
Inconsistencies in combining and successfully integrating multiple information 
points are a weakness in the collection phase of the cycle. Fortunately, multiple layers of 
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information are integrated into WFDDS to provide fire leadership with the best possible 
facts during the decision-making process.137 
Similar, but smaller projects, such as the integrated reporting of wildland-fire 
information (IRWIN), show promise in the use of technology for the integration of 
complex information sets from multiple sources in wildland fire intelligence collection. 
Sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Agriculture USFS, and the DOI, IRWIN focuses 
on bringing information together from multiple applications to reduce redundancy and 
improve data quality. IRWIN currently integrates over 20 applications, with five to six 
additional applications planned per year in subsequent years.138 Initiatives, such as 
IRWIN, and the previously mentioned HPWREN, show promise as to what the future 
hold regarding data collection and unification fire information. Systems that integrate 
multiple technology data sources like IRWIN and the WFDDS mapping system represent 
a potential or desired move forward to better information collection.  
3. Processing 
“Processing involves converting the vast amount of information collected to a 
form usable by analysts through data reduction.”139 Efficient processing of the data and 
information needed to create focused intelligence is taking place in the fire service in the 
predictive services sections at the GACCs. Similarities exist between the processing 
phase of the CIA intelligence cycle and processing currently in use by the fire service.  
a. Strengths  
Much of the processing that occurs in developing fire centric intelligence involves 
translating scientific data points into layman terms that fire managers and firefighters 
both can understand. For example, the desired component of a wildland fire intelligence 
product may be the probability of ignition (PIG), which is the estimated percentage that a 
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firebrand will cause ignition when it contacts receptive fuels.140 The variable data points 
to determine the PIG, such as dry bulb temperature readings, shading components, and 
fine dead fuel moistures, are used in the processing phase. The processed data assists 
intelligence practitioners in the analysis phase when coupling the data points, such as the 
PIG with other weather indices and geospatial information.  
The Santa Ana wind threat index (SAWTI) is another example of the fire service 
working on processing methods like the CIA intelligence cycle. The SAWTI categorizes 
Santa Ana winds in five categories that indicate the probability of fire growth and ability 
to stop the fire: no rating, marginal, moderate, high and extreme.141 These categories are 
determined by processing two data sets focused on fuel conditions and weather models. 
The index uses a prognostic fuel model that measures dead fuel moisture, live fuel 
moisture, and the greenness of annual grasses. This fuel condition data set is combined 
with a weather model derived from wind speed and the moisture in the air to create a 
large fire potential forecast. This forecast is then linked to a historical fire incidence to 
establish the index rating. Since Santa Ana winds are a California phenomenon, the 
regions that the SAWTI include are Zone 1 (Los Angeles/Ventura), Zone 2 
(Orange/Inland Empire), Zone 3 (San Diego), and Zone 4 (Santa Barbara).142 This 
intelligence tool processes specific information from multiple data points to create an 
intelligence product that can then be analyzed for best use.  
b. Weaknesses  
The processing of information so that it is helpful to analysts is only as effective 
as the ability to collect the requisite data. As the producers of the intelligence receive the 
collected information, a level of assumption is made that all the needed information is 
present. If more significant volumes of information are collected, enhanced processing 
capabilities need to occur with improved technology. It follows that as technological 
                                                 
140 “Glossary A–Z,” National Wildfire Coordinating Group, December 2, 2016, https://www.nwcg. 
gov/glossary/a-z#letter_p. 
141 “Santa Ana Wildfire Threat Index,” Southern California Geographic Coordinating Center, 
accessed February 22, 2017, https://gacc.nifc.gov/oscc/predictive/weather/SAWTI.htm. 
142 “Forecast Report,” USDA Forest Service and Predictive Services, accessed February 22, 2017, 
http://sawti.fs.fed.us/#8/33.982/-119.185. 
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innovation occurs in data collection, enhancements will also occur in the processing 
stage.  
4. Analysis 
“Analysis describes the process of evaluating data for reliability, validity, and 
relevance; integrating and analyzing it; and converting the product of this effort into a 
meaningful whole, which includes assessments of events and implications of the 
information collected.”143 The CIA intelligence cycle has some alignment with the 
WFDSS process. The WFDSS indicates “when assessing a fire situation, a cyclical process 
of assessment, risk-characterization, analysis, and deliberation begins in order to make a 
risk-informed decision,” which is similar to the cyclical process of the intelligence cycle 
that includes the analysis phase.144  
Several USFS analytic successes in the wildland fire realm include BehavePlus, 
FARSITE, and FlamMap. These programs provide predictive analytics based on variable 
input information.  
BehavePlus is composed of a collection of mathematical models that 
describe fire behavior, fire effects, and the fire environment based on 
specified fuel and moisture conditions. The program simulates rate of fire 
spread, spotting distance, scorch height, tree mortality, fuel moisture, wind 
adjustment factor, and many other fire behaviors and effects.145 
FARSITE computes wildfire growth and behavior for long time periods 
under heterogeneous conditions of terrain, fuels, and weather. It uses 
existing fire behavior models for surface fire spread, crown fire initiation, 
and crown fire spread, post-frontal combustion, and dead fuel moisture.146 
The FlamMap fire mapping and analysis system describe potential fire 
behavior for constant environmental conditions (weather and fuel 
                                                 
143 Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook on Intelligence. 
144 Noonan-Wright, “Developing the U.S. Wildland Fire Decision Support System,” 4. 
145 “BehavePlus,” Fire, Fuel, and Smoke Science Program and the Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory, 
accessed March 2, 2017, https://www.firelab.org/project/behaveplus. 
146 “FARSITE,” Fire, Fuel, and Smoke Science Program and the Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory, 
accessed March 19, 2017, https://www.firelab.org/project/farsite. 
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moisture). FlamMap permits conditioning of dead fuels in each pixel 
based on slope, shading, elevation, aspect, and weather.147 
These systems allow for fire scientists and fire behavior analysts to take collected and 
processed information and turn it into actionable intelligence to be used by fire managers 
or firefighters battling an ongoing fire.  
a. Strengths 
Wildland fire centric strengths in the analysis process are centered on predicting 
fire behavior.  
b. Weaknesses  
Still, weaknesses exist, which include the unavailability of SMEs to analyze 
collected and processed data. This identified weakness could provide an opportunity for 
fusion center integration. Without adequate SMEs, analysis leading to finished 
intelligence falls short unless the analysis is automated. Two examples of SMEs in the 
field are fire behavior analysts (FBAN) and long-term fire analysts (LTAN). The NWCG, 
a critical sanctioning agency for ICS standards and qualifications, recognizes both 
positions. The FBAN and LTAN positions are responsible for producing wildland fire 
decision support documents and make recommendations to fire service leadership. If 
resources like FBANs and LTANs are available to perform analysis, then actionable 
intelligence will likely result from the process.  
5. Dissemination 
Dissemination is the distribution of the finished intelligence to the consumers, the 
same policymakers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements.”148 As stated 
previously, the CIA intelligence cycle is not currently used in the fire service, but, 
dissemination of intelligence is regularly used to meet the needs of fire agencies and 
decision makers.  
                                                 
147 “FlamMap,” Fire, Fuel, and Smoke Science Program and the Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory, 
accessed March 19, 2017, https://www.firelab.org/project/flammap. 
148 Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook on Intelligence. 
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a. Strengths  
Numerous wildland fire centric dissemination sources are available at a regional 
and national level. The GACCs are a prime example of a regional entity. At a national 
level, the National Interagency Coordination Center provides short-term and seasonal 
outlooks that consider the entire United States. Another example of a national level 
dissemination platform is the USFS’s Emergency Management and Response—
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC). EMR-ISAC distributes for 
official use only intelligence (FOUO) products and weekly open source and non-sensitive 
documents. The goal of the EMR-ISAC is to provide products that support public safety 
agencies in their all-hazards missions.149  
b. Weaknesses  
Despite the successes of fire service intelligence dissemination efforts, evaluating 
the possibility for enhancements can yield areas of improvement. One common problem 
is lack of connectivity. For example, the GACCs and the existing network of fusion 
centers are both well-established dissemination platforms that operate efficiently, but 
they do not have an established connection for information sharing. Although they both 
handle multiple types of intelligence, they are different in many ways and do not 
coordinate the dissemination of information. This difference is in part due to their 
differing subject matter expertise, which for the GACCs, is primarily focused on wildland 
fires. In contrast, the all-risk, all-hazard mission mindset at many fusion centers may 
reduce intelligence specificity, at least with intelligence that relates to fires. Some fire 
service intelligence customers may perceive wildland fire intelligence as irrelevant if the 
threat is not applicable to their region. Ohio is one example, with few wildland fires and 
two fusion centers, the Ohio Statewide Terrorism Analysis and Crime Center and the 
Greater Cincinnati Fusion Center.150 Still, coordination in the dissemination of 
                                                 
149 United States Fire Administration, Emergency Services Sector Factsheet (Emmitsburg, MD: 
United States Fire Administration, n.d.), accessed November 6, 2017, https://www.usfa.fema.gov/down 
loads/pdf/emr-isac_factsheet.pdf. 
150 National Interagency Fire Center, National Year-to-Date Report on Fires and Acres Burned by 
State and Agency for 03/16/2018 (Boise, ID: National Interagency Fire Center, 2018), https://gacc.nifc.gov/ 
sacc/predictive/intelligence/NationalYTDbyStateandAgency.pdf. 
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information with fusion centers may be worthwhile to fire service, given the size of the 
network. The magnitude of the fusion center network is huge by comparison to fire 
service coordinating centers; 79 fusion centers and only 10 GACCs (see the Appendix). 
From a sheer numbers perspective, the national network of fusion centers allows for more 
significant dissemination.  
Another difference between the GACCs and fusion centers is the availability of 
SMEs who are traditionally embedded at GACC locations. These experts are most 
commonly professional meteorologists, who are often not considered or placed at fusion 
centers. Related to this point, fire service representation at the fusion centers is not 
specifically uniform; some fire service fusion representatives serve as generalists, while 
others may have investigations, hazardous materials, urban search, and rescue or wildland 
firefighting backgrounds.  
With the primary mission of logistical coordination and mobilization at the 
GACCs, the intelligence needs have a slightly different tone.151 The GACC predictive 
services components include intelligence products that identify regional resource 
requirements and provide fire danger outlooks to local fire service leaders. The fire 
service intelligence needs from the fusion centers most effectively fall under the all-risk 
mission. With only 77 percent of the centers identifying their primary mission as all-
hazard, a void is created that needs filling.152 Twenty-three percent of the centers would 
not include disasters, such as wildland fires, in their core mission.  
Another gap that may need to be addressed is related to the type of fusion center. 
Of the 79 fusion centers, 54 are categorized as primary fusion centers, and 25 are 
recognized fusion centers.153 The primary fusion centers deliver statewide information 
and intelligence, whereas the recognized fusion centers focus on major urban areas.154 
States that only have primary fusion centers often required to fulfill both regional and 
                                                 
151 Geographic Area Coordination Centers, “About Us.” 
152 Department of Homeland Security, 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report, 9. 
153 “Fusion Center Locations,” Department of Homeland Security, last published January 9, 2018, 
https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information. 
154 Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations.”  
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local needs. Without regional relevance, threat and warning intelligence often is too 
broad or vague to accomplish a defined intelligence need.  
B. SUMMARY 
Identifying core issues of the intelligence cycle and its direct application to 
wildland fires was the goal of this chapter. Although the fire service does not use a 
formalized intelligence cycle, some current practices are consistent with the CIA model. 
When looking at the components’ parts and processes currently in use, information 
indicates a value in the application of the intelligence cycle for fire service decision 
makers. This chapter discussed the fire service’s informal adoption of the five constituent 
components of the CIA intelligence cycle model, including the strengths and the gaps or 
problems of each in the way they currently are applied in the fire services. The 
application of the intelligence cycle can be helpful to producers of the intelligence and 
customers alike despite some of the current implementation challenges.  
Planning for large-scale wildland fires and their prevention is an enduring focus 
that depends on effective intelligence production. The collection and processing of 
information, such as weather indices and geographic areas at risk, support the planning 
portion of the cycle. Current analysis actions create finished fire intelligence that can be 
further enhanced in the future as technology evolves. The dissemination component of 
the intelligence cycle appears to occur in single, isolated paths that are too linear. 
Expanding dissemination can also support the adoption of the intelligence cycle.  
Chapter V is a case study of the 2012 Waldo Canyon fire. Focusing on the CIA 
intelligence cycle model, the five individual phases of the cycle are assessed to evaluate 
utilization before, during, or after the fire.  
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V. CASE STUDY: WALDO CANYON FIRE 
Some lessons are being learned about how we can mitigate some of the 
fires in the future. Hopefully, out of this tragedy, some long-term planning 
occurs, and it may be that we can curb some of the damage that happens 
the next time. 
President Obama at the Waldo Canyon fire155 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a case study of the Waldo Canyon fire and provides an 
analysis of the fire service’s use of intelligence to determine whether components of the 
intelligence cycle were present and used during each phase of the fire. It opens with a 
description of the fire and relevant antecedent events to provide an understanding of the 
scale of the incident and actions by public safety. The analysis includes an evaluation of 
intelligence utilization and the application of the CIA intelligence cycle process to the 
case of the Waldo Fire. The discussion is organized according to the phases of the CIA 
cycle and takes into account the nuances of the fire. Although the fire service did not 
officially use the intelligence cycle as a model at any point in this case, principles of the 
CIA model were apparent before, during, and after the fire. The case study concludes 
with an evaluation of how the fire could have been handled more effectively if the 
principles of the intelligence cycle had been comprehensively applied.  
B. SCENARIO 
On Saturday, June 23, 2012, a fire started in Pike National Forest, approximately 
three miles west of the city of Colorado Springs. It burned for 18 days and was declared 
contained on July 10, 2012; it had burned for more than two weeks.156 Significant 
impacts affected multiple communities, with 18,247 acres and 347 homes burned and 46 
                                                 
155 “President Obama’s Remarks in Colorado Springs on Waldo Canyon Fire,” Denver Post, June 29, 
2012, http://www.denverpost.com/2012/06/29/president-obamas-remarks-in-colorado-springs-on-waldo-
canyon-fire/. 
156 “President Obama’s Remarks in Colorado Springs on Waldo Canyon Fire,” 5. 
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homes damaged. The fire-affected jurisdictions included the NFS (14,422 acres), El Paso 
County (2,309 acres), and the City of Colorado Springs (1,516 acres).157 Of the 52,056 
residents affected, 28,770 people from 11 different areas were evacuated, and two people 
died, which made the Waldo Canyon fire one of the most destructive wildland fires in 
Colorado history.158 The fire’s costs were significant: $15.7 million for fire suppression 
and $350 million for property damage.159  
As the size of the fire grew, so did the number of structures and population that 
was threatened (Table 2). 
Table 2.   Timeline of Waldo Canyon Fire.160 





6/23/12 2,000   0% 
6/24/12 3,600 13,000  0% 
6/24/12 County Disaster Declaration  
FMAG is approved 
6/25/12 4,500 15,000  5% 
6/26/12 6,200 15,000 30,000 5% 
6/27/12 18,500 20,000 32,000 5% 
6/28/12 16,750*  23,000  15% 
6/28/12 Presidential Disaster Declaration 
Human remains found in the fire ruins 
6/30/12 17,659 15,000  55% 
                                                 
157 Denver Post, 106. 
158 Denver Post, 107.  
159 Fred Durso Jr., “After Waldo Canyon,” NFPA Journal, September 1, 2012, http://www.nfpa. 
org/news-and-research/publications/nfpa-journal/2012/september-october-2012/features/after-waldo-
canyon. 
160 Adapted from “Waldo Canyon Fire Review, Pike and San Isabel National Forest,” USDA Forest 
Service, June 2013, https://www.fs.fed.us/fire/publications/fire_review_reports/2012/waldo_canyon.docx. 
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6/30/12 347 confirmed structures destroyed 
7/03/22 18,247   88% 
7/03/12 Secretary of Homeland Security site visit 
7/10/22 18,247   100% 
* Acreage dropped as more accurate numbers were measured. 
 
C. BACKGROUND 
The 2012 Waldo Canyon fire is a noteworthy fire in Colorado’s wildland fire 
history based on the fire’s size and the damage it caused, which led to a significant 
amount of discussion and reports on it from government and other public safety agencies, 
science, and academia. However, the majority of available information comes from 
public safety and jurisdictional government, although a variety of agencies subsequently 
conducted after action reviews to evaluate areas of strength, weakness, and 
improvement.161  
Since the fire posed a significant risk to life, property, and the environment, on 
June 24, 2012, FEMA issued a FMAG. The FMAG declaration creates a FEMA funding 
source to offset the state’s eligible firefighting costs for managing, mitigating, and 
controlling the fire. Ultimately, President Obama declared a major disaster for Colorado, 
as the event met the severity and magnitude criteria for supplemental federal 
                                                 
161 After Action Reviews (AARs) are performed to discuss what transpired in sufficient detail and 
transparency. The key points include what was the plan, what happened, why it did happen, what went well 
and why, and what can be done better the next time. The ultimate goal is to correct weaknesses and sustain 
strengths. “Incident Response Pocket Guide,” National Wildfire Coordinating Group Incident Standards 
Working Team, January 2014, Xii. 
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assistance.162 The supplemental federal assistance allocated additional federal response 
and recovery funds of approximately $4 million.163 
Colorado Senators Udall and Bennet requested that the USDA conduct a 
comprehensive scientific review of the fire to “examine the factors that led to the level of 
intensity and damage, and learn what can be done to reduce future risks.”164 Following 
approval, the NIST started work on the area to enhance wildfire disaster resilience 
through risk reduction, and its resulting study exemplifies “the most comprehensive 
examination of a wildland-urban interface fire.”165 The report noted that before the 
Waldo Canyon incident, no nationally recognized system for preplanning risks to 
structures or entire communities existed.166 A system is necessary to gain a clear 
understanding of the significant exposure risks and vulnerabilities for individuals and the 
greater community. NIST researcher Maranghides stated, “It is not critical you have the 
answer 100 percent of the time, you just need to know how much you can trust it.”167 
The NIST study provides the vision forward to deal better with the enduring threat.  
D. INTELLIGENCE RELATED TO THE WALDO CANYON FIRE 
The Waldo Canyon fire is no different from other disasters regarding the 
implementation of post-incident evaluation to increase the understanding of the factors 
leading to it and how effectively it was managed. Although several agencies conducted 
post-incident evaluations, none performed analyses related to intelligence models. The 
remainder of this chapter discusses and evaluates the application of the CIA intelligence 
cycle model and its five individual phases to all stages of the Waldo Canyon fire. What 
                                                 
162 “President Declares Major Disaster for Colorado,” Department of Homeland Security, release 
number: HQ-12-050, June 29, 2012, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2012/06/29/president-declares-
major-disaster-colorado-0. 
163 Department of Homeland Security. 
164 Pam Zubeck, “Waldo Canyon fire Spreads in the Scientific Community,” Colorado Springs 
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follows is a description of how the Intelligence Cycle could have been applied during the 
Waldo Canyon Fire, which became apparent during post-incident reconstruction.  
1. Intelligence Cycle Phase 1—Planning/Direction 
Identification of the threat and determination of how to mitigate that risk best 
represent the core purpose of the planning component of the intelligence cycle. The 
FEMA target and core capabilities identify planning as the systematic method to meet 
established objectives. This definition of planning has a direct correlation to the planning 
and direction phase of the intelligence cycle.168 “Wildland Urban Interface fires are very 
different from earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes where the hazard cannot be 
controlled,” said NIST fire researcher and principal investigator Alexander 
Maranghides.169 This perspective has provided an opportunity and impetus to plan for 
wildland fire threats. To develop a useful planning model, fostering variable stakeholder 
interactions is necessary.170 With respect to the Waldo Fire, because of the history of 
wildfires in the area, planning was a long-term process involving various agencies that 
began years before the incident. Colorado Springs is progressive in its approach to 
lessening the risk in the WUI, and several formal policies resulted from the mitigation 
efforts. These policies included the wildfire mitigation plan (2001), Colorado Springs 
community wildfire protection plan (2011), and WUI evacuation appendix (2008).171 The 
last update to the WUI evacuation appendix took place before the fire in 2012. All these 
policies provided a backdrop to the planning component and serve as the initial formal 
recognition of a wildland fire problem in the area.  
                                                 
168 FEMA target and capability planning definition: Planning is the mechanism through which federal, 
state, local and tribal governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector 
develop, validate, and maintain plans, policies, and procedures describing how they will prioritize, 
coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, equipment, and resources to prevent, protect and 
mitigate against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events. Department of Homeland Security, 
National Preparedness Goal, 6. 
169 NIST, “NIST Study of Colorado Wildfire Shows Actions Can Change Outcomes.” 
170 Brooks et al., “Collaborative Capacity,” 1. 
171 “City of Colorado Springs Waldo Canyon fire Initial After Action Report,” Wildfire Today, 6, 
October 23, 2012, http://wildfiretoday.com/documents/WaldoCynFireAAR.pdf. 
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The planning goal was to identify the communities at risk in the interface area. 
Before the Waldo Fire, community exposure to a disastrous wildland fire was apparent, 
and the 2012 report indicated that in the previous two decades, 250,000 people had 
moved into Colorado’s highest wildland fire risk areas.172 The growing high-risk areas, 
known as red zones, have been a vital focus of the planning and direction of the location 
of the threats, which includes determining the mechanisms most critical to mitigating fire 
risk. The population growth continues; 31 percent of Coloradans live in red zones, thus 
indicating the potential exposure to a large proportion of the state’s citizens.173 In 2002, 
the Colorado Springs fire department created a red zone map that identified 35,000 
homes at risk.174 This number is now likely much higher. This information is updated 
regularly and readily available to government agencies and the public. Monitoring 
building trends, population movements, and identified threat areas (red zones) provides 
the building blocks for planning and direction. These actions are analogous to 
intelligence preparation of the operating environment (IPOE) with the primary objective 
of providing predictive intelligence.175  
The planning phase can also incorporate pre-established actions to mitigate the 
risk. The Fire Adapted Communities (FAC) Coalition, a group of key stakeholders 
focused on wildland interface safety, made it clear that active partnerships in the planning 
phase are critical to gathering lasting support and broadening influence.176 Through these 
partnerships, FEMA awarded pre-disaster mitigation grants to Colorado Springs in 2005, 
2007, 2009, and 2012. The grants provided for fuel reduction and management programs 
designed to create defensible spaces throughout communities at risk. After the Waldo 
                                                 
172 Michael Kodas and Burt Hubbard, “Policies Put More Coloradans at Risk,” Rocky Mountain PBS 
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Fire, an 82 percent property-save rate in specific communities resulted from the planned 
mitigation efforts.177  
The planning component of the intelligence cycle can create the foundation for 
sustained early warning, which has been the case in the Waldo area. A starting point of 
the cycle evolves through a range of pre-fire and pre-mitigation efforts that evaluate the 
extent of social, economic, and ecological impacts.178 When a fire occurs, the planning 
process begins again to determine alternative strategies to deal with the effects of the fire. 
Focusing on a large-scale area is key to pre-fire mitigation endeavors intended to protect 
the 70,000 communities at risk of wildfire throughout the United States.179 In the case of 
the Waldo Canyon fire, the communities that responded to early warning information 
experienced much better results compared to communities that responded later. The 
resulting intelligence-based preparation yielded higher mitigation rates in those early 
response areas.  
2. Intelligence Cycle Phase 2—Data Collection 
The data collection process plays an important role before, during, and after a 
wildfire starts. The type of data collected is based on several factors that ultimately 
provide a clear understanding of risk and vulnerability of individual structures and entire 
communities.180 The pre-incident collection of key information is a significant factor that 
protected several communities from the impacts of the Waldo Canyon fire and was a 
process within an established prevention program. Part of that wildland fire prevention 
process by the city of Colorado Springs was the collection of LIDAR imaging from 
aircraft, which provided a visual representation of communities at risk. In Colorado 
Springs, LIDAR information and images defined the magnitude and scale of plant life, 
structures, vehicles, and topography, and continue to provide support for the city’s fire 
department fire prevention programs.181 The fire department managed the resulting 
                                                 
177 Quarles et al., 23. 
178 Wildfire Today, “City of Colorado Springs Waldo Canyon fire Initial After Action Report,” 8. 
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intelligence as a tool to identify communities at risk, which in the case of the Waldo fire 
helped to minimize fire impacts, and was also useful after extinguishment. Comparative 
data was available due to the use of historical LIDAR information, and researchers and 
investigators then had a clear understanding of what precisely existed in the area before 
the incident.  
During the fire, data collection was a focus of the LTAN assigned to the fire. 
“The role of the LTAN is to provide probabilistic and deterministic information on long-
term fire advancement, fire behavior, and spread direction, based on local information, 
topography, historical and current fire spread, and with historical and current fire weather 
data.”182 The LTAN filled an important position on the type 1 national incident 
management team (IMT) by monitoring weather and fuel conditions and then predicting 
fire growth and spread. The resulting data collection supported predictive fire modeling 
programs that estimated the fire progression in the coming days and included historical, 
current, and future weather patterns that provided accurate modeling.183 Additional 
infrared information was collected from fixed-wing aerial platforms and satellite imagery 
to support the intelligence production.  
During the fire incident, scientists from NIST, with assistance from the USFS, 
investigated what burned, how badly it burned, and why it burned.184 The study’s 
findings were used to create best practice prevention measures while supporting future 
firefighting tactics. The Waldo Canyon fire set in motion a two-tiered system for 
collecting actionable information after a fire has occurred, with one tier representing 
collection during the fire and the second tier focused on future prevention.185 Experts 
understood that the collection of data after an incident had occurred would not change the 
outcomes of the event, but it could affect future comparable incidents. Following the 
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planning phase, the NIST researchers created a detailed timeline of the Waldo Canyon 
fire. The timeline research relied on a variety of collection inputs including interviews 
with the public and responders, weather data, aerial imagery, photos and video, and 
automated vehicle locators (AVL).186 After the collection phase of the intelligence cycle, 
the amassed NIST data moved on to the processing phase. 
In addition to NIST, the FAC collected relevant data after the fire occurred. The 
FAC focus was a social-centric approach as compared to the science-centric approach of 
the NIST. The configuration of the FAC assessment team reinforced the value of a 
variety of SMEs in the collection process. The FAC team had two sets of researchers, one 
set with structural and forestry specialists and the second with social scientists and public 
education experts.187  
The FAC collection attempts focused on home assessments to capture data on 
how the homes ignited during the Waldo Canyon fire. During field inspections of homes, 
the FAC wildfire mitigation assessment team examined the building materials and 
construction techniques used in all residences, and damaged homes were compared to 
non-damaged homes. Vulnerability identification helped characterize the causative 
factors that led to the most structural damage.188 The compilation of these data by the 
FAC is consistent with the CIA intelligence cycle’s human observation (HUMINT) 
process. Photographs (IMINT) and global positioning system (GPS) data (GEOINT) 
provided support for interview data (HUMINT) collected by assessment team members. 
The primary data sets were (a) fire spread from vegetation to the building, (b) fire spread 
from non-structural combustibles, and (c) home-to-home fire spread. The assessment 
team used surveys called damage assessment forms to gather the information, and for 
consistency, the FAC form mirrors that employed by the NIST to assess any damage 
from a fire. The FAC’s goal is to collect data on the impacts after a fire, which served a 
vital role in the Waldo Canyon area, to prevent future disasters. Ultimately, the field 
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survey validated findings of other investigations specific to the underlying causes of 
structural ignition.189 The post-fire data collection played an essential role in formulating 
intelligence designed to reduce future impacts from similar fires. This data collection 
methodology is in alignment with phase 2 of the CIA intelligence cycle.  
3. Intelligence Cycle Phase 3—Processing 
The processing phase of the intelligence cycle aggregates the collection 
information and packages the data for subsequent analysis. Deconfliction of various 
information sources is often an essential processing step necessary to confirm the 
reliability of the source data. The El Paso County Sheriff’s Office after action report 
provided a reliable characterization of how the processing component of the cycle was 
applied. The Office established a joint information center (JIC) to create universal 
messaging with representatives from six municipalities and two impacted counties.190 In 
addition to the various jurisdictions, over 50 fire and law enforcement agencies 
participated in various data processing.191 The vast amount of data collected from the 
various entities required an efficient processing component that included active 
engagement with press information officers, emergency operations centers, and incident 
command posts to improve overall processing abilities.192 Throughout the entire incident, 
all key agencies had continual staffing, which provided an all-inclusive scope of 
information. This 24-hour staffing model supported rapid information dissemination to 
the public.  
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The inherent variation in the data received in the processing phase necessitated 
intensive coordination that was detailed and nuanced. During the NIST study, anomalies 
in different information sets existed in the data collection, and the processing phase 
played a crucial role in the identification and correction of the inconsistencies. In the CIA 
intelligence cycle, problems with unclear data or potentially inaccurate data collection 
can be resolved by comparing different data sources to guarantee accuracy. One example 
occurred with some of the Waldo Canyon photo and video imagery, as the data captured 
in specific locations did not have accurate timestamps. A solution was found by pairing 
AVL data to create a plus/minus variation in time stamping on the photo and video 
media.193 Processing such examples provide information that can accurately be analyzed 
to make strategic and tactical recommendations.  
The volume of data collected from multiple sources, which can leave fire service 
and other public safety agencies exceeding their capabilities, may adversely affect the 
processing phase of the intelligence cycle and limit the use of gathered data. For the raw 
data collected to be usable, relevant, and sensitive to the needs of the intended consumer, 
collaborative communication must take place.194 Fortunately, data sets collected before, 
during, and after the Waldo Canyon fire supported actionable analysis that resulted from 
multi-agency interoperability and open lines of communication.  
4. Intelligence Cycle Phase 4—Analysis 
Analysis of the information collected in advance of a fire or after it can provide an 
improved early warning system to prevent a catastrophic reoccurrence. In the case of the 
Waldo Canyon fire, the most influential analysis occurred after the fire. The FAC 
investigation of the post-fire environment in Colorado Springs compared the outcomes of 
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American Development Bank, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0000408#sthash.7CyR58Vy.dpuf.  
194 Odom, Fixing Intelligence, 33. 
 78 
the fire to mitigation strategies recommended by the FAC program.195 Four primary risk 
and mitigation strategies to reduce future fires resulted from the analysis:  
• Building design and material improvements and maintenance could have 
reduced loss.  
• A community-wide approach is best. 
• Fuels reduction is important.  
• Partners in preparedness can equal success.196 
The four risk and mitigation strategies are helpful in the analysis phase by further 
identifying intelligence products and dissemination needs. Building design and material 
improvement are directly associated with the prevention component of wildland fires. 
Construction features, building materials, landscaping, and natural vegetation all 
constitute fuels. Accurately analyzing the connections between these fuels further 
identifies the level of exposure for impacted communities. The concept of a community-
wide approach, when aligned with messaging and dissemination, meets the needs of both 
the citizenry served and the fire service. This community-wide approach is further 
supported by establishing a lasting partnership with all impacted stakeholders. Actionable 
intelligence to prevent reoccurrence or minimize consequences continues to evolve for 
these identified strategies.  
The NIST study, which reflects another effort to analyze data from the fire, 
recognized that actions before a fire could change outcomes for like situations in the 
future. Its analysis of data collection created a wildland urban interface hazard scale that 
mapped the variable ranges of exposure risk. These risks identify the threat from embers 
and active fire throughout the community, and also pinpoint specific neighborhoods and 
area within the broader Colorado Springs region.197 Additional analysis determined that 
high-density structure-to-structure spacing is a significant consideration that needs to be 
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addressed to enhance safety. Further, any identified issues in structural or spatial 
arrangement represent data that goes back into the intelligence cycle for use by key 
officials and stakeholders. The analysis of the additional data drives updated fire 
prevention messaging to communities at risk.198 The NIST work in wildland fires and the 
wildland-urban interface is an ongoing national program designed to enhance disaster 
resilience. Reducing fire risk on buildings, critical infrastructure, communities, and 
emergency responders enhances any WUI community’s resistance to adverse impacts.199  
Post-fire analysis from a meteorological and climatological perspective is 
valuable to understanding future fire risk. In the case of the Waldo Canyon fire, the 
analysis included a comparison of before and after weather and geospatial data that 
included geographic information system (GIS) images, aerial images, thermal readings, 
and vegetation models.200 All the information collected and analyzed from the fire has 
been used to support risk calculation and anticipated fire spread. The overall goal of the 
analysis is to find correlations between weather conditions and vegetation, to try to model 
the data to help forecast fire seasons and more efficiently prepare emergency 
responders.201  
In addition to forecast and post-fire analysis, the real-time analysis was conducted 
during the Waldo Canyon fire by the Colorado Information and Analysis Center (CIAC), 
which is the Colorado fusion center. CIAC operations take an all-hazards approach to the 
intelligence cycle and focus on multiple threats, including natural disasters.202 During 
2012, several high-profile opportunities to support the all-hazard mission mindset in 
Colorado arose with incidents as varied as the Aurora theatre shooting, the United States 
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Presidential debates, and the Waldo Canyon fire.203 Specific to the Waldo Canyon fire, 
the CIAC deployed mobile analytic response teams to the fire to provide on-scene 
intelligence support.204 The response team provided investigative support that generated 
tactical and operational intelligence to support incident commanders and policymakers. 
5. Intelligence Cycle Phase 5—Dissemination 
The Colorado Springs fire department has a pre-fire mitigation program that was 
in place for years before the Waldo Canyon fire. The Mountain Shadows community took 
the brunt of the fire’s impact, and only an estimated five percent of homes in that 
community participated in the wildfire mitigation efforts that urged residents to safeguard 
their homes against these types of fire.205 This lack of action indicates some weakness in 
the dissemination of early warning information. In contrast, the community of Cedar 
Heights largely embraced pre-fire mitigation efforts, as an estimated 60 percent of 
residences participated in hardening their homes’ defenses.206 Cedar Heights suffered 
significantly less damage than Mountain Shadows since the community acted on the 
assessed threat to the community. 
The dissemination of evacuation orders to communities affected by the Waldo 
Canyon fire had both strengths and weaknesses. In most situations, early warning allowed 
for quick evacuation processes with clearly defined road closures, and the information 
distributed to the public minimized life loss and removed large portions of the population 
from harm. However, the lack of clear and concise terminology in the evacuation orders 
and communications created some messaging issues. The use of a mass notification 
system that was not tailored to specific communities and used vague language resulted in 
evaluation ambiguity for many residents. Terms such, as pre-evacuation, voluntary 
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evacuation, and mandatory evacuation, needed precise definitions to alleviate confusion 
among the public.207  
The fire burned within 1.5 miles of the City of Woodland Park, so the city had to 
disseminate evacuation information and address related issues. To ensure the information 
reached a broad audience, Woodland Park officials used a variety of dissemination and 
information-sharing platforms that included public briefings, press releases, smartphone 
messaging, reverse 911, Facebook, YouTube, streaming video, a city website, electronic 
messaging signs, local television, cable television, and the emergency messaging system 
Nixle.208 Table 3 illustrates the full spectrum of dissemination methodologies used 
during the fire on June 27, 2012, as evacuations became critical.  
Table 3.   June 27, 2012, Woodland Park Chronology of Intelligence 
Dissemination.209 





Televised Press Briefing from Colorado Springs. As of 
11:00 PM June 26, 15,324 acres burned. Fire sentries placed 
every 50 yards along U.S. Hwy 24 in the Cascade to prevent 





Teller County Sheriff’s Office [situational update] briefing. 
Winds for today are expected to be out of the west and 
southwest. There is 0–5% containment of the fire. There 
will be back burning near Rampart Reservoir. The fire is 







● City website 
Woodland Park Mayor and City Manager brief city 
employees and citizens in council chambers of current 
situation including possible evacuations. The briefing was 






Nixle email and text message from Teller County: 
Mandatory Evacuation—East Teller County/Woodland 
Park, See local media—website for details  
                                                 
207 El Paso County Sheriff’s Office, Waldo Canyon fire After Action Report, 16.  
208 City of Woodland Park, City of Woodland Park Waldo Canyon fire After Action Report (Woodland 
Park, CO: City of Woodland Park, 2013), 11, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/50176896/city-
of-woodland-park-waldo-canyon-fire-after-action-report. 
209 City of Woodland Park, 12–13. 
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Nixle email and text message from Woodland Park Police 
Department: Mandatory Evacuation East Teller County and 
previously identified standby evacuation areas in Woodland 
Park. See Teller City web page for a map.  
1:15 
PM ● Press release 
Press Release from Teller County is announcing the 
mandatory evacuation of portions of Woodland Park and 
Teller County. 
1:32 
PM ● Reverse 911 
Reverse 911 message to specific areas: Your area is under 
mandatory evacuation. Please remain calm and evacuate the 
area in an orderly manner. An evacuation shelter has been 
set up at Cripple Creek and Victor High School. 
 
The Colorado Springs Independent provides an alternate view of the success of 
the dissemination. Pam Zubeck, one of the paper’s journalists, asserts that the differences 
in destruction between the Cedar Heights and Mountain Shadows communities resulted 
from the variances in the distribution of the first resources. Cedar Heights, with an 
average home value of $546,000, had 23 fire apparatus assigned on the second day of the 
fire, while Mountain Shadows, with an average home value of $340,000, had no fire 
apparatus assigned to it on that same day.210 Evidence indicates that this comparison may 
have been taken out of context. The allocation of resources was likely based on strategic 
decisions linked to current and expected weather conditions, as well as the defensibility 
of the communities at risk. Minimal destruction validated the effective dissemination and 
marketing of the known hazard exposures to the community of Cedar Heights. 
Disseminating the analysis conducted by the FAC has been facilitated efficiently 
by the Colorado Springs wildfire mitigation firewise program, which was launched in 
2002 and encompasses 36,485 individual addresses in the WUI.211 Its educational 
campaign called “Sharing the Responsibility” has yielded positive results through 
increased community engagement. The educational focus has involved layers of 
                                                 
210 Pam Zubeck, “Misfire, How City Leadership Left Residents—and Their Heroes—Exposed during 
the Waldo Canyon Tragedy,” Colorado Springs Independent, December 12, 2102, http://www.csindy.com/ 
coloradosprings/misfire/Content?oid=2598215. 
211 Quarles et al., Lessons Learned from Waldo Canyon, 5. 
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stakeholders and included the individual homeowners to entire communities.212 This 
program and others like it serve as an appropriate information distribution tool. 
Regarding the Waldo Canyon fire, the success of programs, such as the Colorado Springs 
wildfire mitigation firewise program, is directly linked to dissemination and adoption of 
actionable information. 
An unintended consequence of information dissemination is residences’ concerns 
about privacy. After providing information to the public concerning what homes were at 
highest risk, some Colorado Springs residents wanted the information to be password 
protected. They did not want their neighbors “spying” on them, to which the Colorado 
Springs fire department officials replied, “We want your neighbors to spy on you.”213 
Although this statement may appear draconian, proper context is needed since the intent 
of the open source, readily-available information is to create a climate of accountability, 
not surveillance. This mindset is comparable to the public safety “see something, say 
something” campaign designed to thwart malicious actors. 
Tactical intelligence was disseminated to firefighting resources through the IMT 
once it assumed command of the fire. The situation unit leader, who is typically part of 
the planning section, prepared incident intelligence by collecting and analyzing incident 
data with feedback from field observers (FOBS) and technical specialists (THSP). The 
feedback originated from personal observations from the FOBS deployed on the fire line 
and information gathered from weather monitoring processed by THSP. The goal is to 
provide frontline fire intelligence to deployed firefighters to allow combat maneuvering 
and appropriate resource ordering. Despite some decent dissemination of information to 
essential officials, shortcomings were identified in regard to getting the most appropriate 
information to agency administrators. The host governmental entities and agencies had 
difficulty integrating with the IMT due to lack of familiarity with the team. An analysis 
of the situation revealed that future training could enhance efficiencies of information 
dissemination by allowing supporting agencies to be actively engaged in the process.214 
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From a strategic perspective, targeted intelligence dissemination is beneficial and 
can be evident throughout the life of an incident. In Colorado Springs, pre-incident 
messaging engaged at least a significant portion of the community to foster preparedness 
and wildfire mitigation work.215 Evacuation orders given during the incident decreased 
life safety impacts to residents and the responders tasked with protecting them. Post-
incident intelligence sharing closes the intelligence cycle process and starts it over again. 
In the case of the Waldo Canyon fire, post-incidence intelligence served to identify 
strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement.  
E. SUMMARY 
Various components or elements of the CIA intelligence cycle were at play in this 
fire, even though a conscious effort may not have been made to use the CIA model or any 
formalized intelligence cycle model. Completely stopping another Waldo Canyon fire is 
not a realistic goal, but minimizing the impacts of one can be accomplished. According to 
Jack Cohen of the Missoula Fire Lab in Montana, “We can still have extreme wildfire 
behavior and still not necessarily have a residential fire disaster.”216 Deconstructing the 
Waldo Canyon fire and examining the various parts of the intelligence cycle’s relevance 
to the event provides a framework for application in the wildland fire environment to 
minimize wildfire impacts on communities. Leveraging existing and evolving policies 
may further improve firefighting efforts in the future. The nature of data gathered before, 
during, and after fires and the application to actionable intelligence may further improve 
outcomes. As the speed of data acquisition increases in the digital age, end users’ 
expectations also increase, as well as the opportunity for fire service and other officials to 
gather, analyze, and disseminate data quickly. The use of the intelligence cycle to prevent 
and manage fires may evolve to help the fire service, and related agencies respond to 
external demands and societal implications in the wildland fire environment. 
The analysis of the Waldo Canyon fire suggests that the pre-fire prevention phase 
can benefit primarily from the use of focused intelligence. The threat of wildland fires is 
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a long-term problem, and communities subject to the most significant risk must be 
prepared, not only to save lives but also for the reason that cost savings can be realized 
through the effective use of the intelligence cycle as a process to limit surprise and 
provide early warning. After practical recommendations to manage fuels better in high-
risk areas, estimates indicate a monetary saving of $12 to $24 for every $1 invested in 
mitigation activities.217 It may be possible to duplicate these results at a national level 
with the pervasive adoption of the intelligence cycle.  
Although traditionally, fire service professionals and academicians have not 
formally created a linkage between wildland fires and the intelligence cycle, this case 
study indicates that all components of the cycle were present to some degree in the 
Waldo Canyon fire case. However, no evidence suggests that a formalized or intentional 
intelligence cycle process occurred even though each phase of the cycle is represented 
independently or in combination with other phases. 
Unforeseen difficulties may arise when using the intelligence cycle model related 
to skepticism of the government’s and residents’ privacy. A resident who lost her home 
in the fire stated, “There was a false sense of ‘the government is in control,’ and no, they 
are not.”218 The case study analysis provided an evaluation to determine whether the 
intelligence cycle and its components were used, which determined that no formal 
intelligence cycle was implemented in handling the fire. However, the assessment 
identified evidence of the employment of the five components of the CIA model. Taking 
the phases of the CIA cycle and applying them comprehensively to wildland intelligence 
efforts could have enhanced the successes observed before, during, and after the Waldo 
Canyon fire, and, thus, have improved outcomes. To date, an intelligence cycle by the 
fire service in the greater Colorado Springs area has not been adopted after the Waldo 
Canyon fire. While many of the previously identified intelligence practices remain in 
place, an opportunity exists to formalize a well-defined wildland fire centric model.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter summarizes the previous five chapters, draws conclusions, and 
makes recommendations about the intelligence cycle and its specific application to 
wildland fire prevention and management. Drawing from earlier discussions in this paper, 
shortcomings and implementation issues are highlighted, and evidence from other fields 
that effectively utilize the intelligence cycle and scholarly research findings are used to 
generate related solutions that could lead to best practices in fire services. How effective 
can the intelligence cycle contribute to reducing the impacts of disastrous wildland fires? 
Based on the published works of both practitioners and researchers, this paper has argued 
that the intelligence cycle may be a practical approach to wildland fire prevention, 
response, and management. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
This thesis examined non-typical applications of the intelligence cycle and its 
components. It is reasonable to characterize the intelligence cycle as a mechanism used to 
lessen the impacts of a perceived or occurring threat. However, for this thesis, the 
intelligence cycle was examined as a tool that could stop bad things from happening. 
Specifically, it has focused on the bad type of event called wildland fires, which are 
disastrous due to the potentially significant negative impact they can create on a 
community or set of communities.  
The complex scope of the wildland fire problem was detailed to include the 
multiple impacts of fires, which involve life loss and bodily injury, property damage, 
environmental damage, and a wide range of fiscal implications. The fiscal impacts are 
shared amongst the victims of the fires, the geographic areas, and the responding 
agencies that can be a blend of local, state, regional, or national. Ultimately, the federal 
government plays a sizeable financial role from the prevention, response, and recovery 
perspectives. Research indicates that the wildland fire problem is best characterized as an 
enduring issue studied by experts from a number of physical science fields, particularly 
from the life and social sciences. The intricacies of the wildland fire problem combined 
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with the broad spectrum of stakeholders—from researchers to practitioners to community 
members—represent the complexity of the issue and potential resolutions.  
This thesis analyzed the intelligence cycle as a process that could be useful to 
meet the needs of decision makers, who often are faced with decisions that must be made 
with only short notice. The examination of the early versions of the cycle and some of the 
most common applications highlighted the core components of the process, as well as 
their dynamics and interrelationships. The discussion of the traditionalist, contrarian, and 
reformist viewpoints of intelligence provided an understanding that interpretation is not 
fixed and the application of the intelligence cycle is best viewed as fluid. Understanding 
the variability of the intelligence cycle models and identifying a primary starting point is 
desired to make future recommendations.  
Determining the existence of a wildland fire intelligence cycle or the use of the 
intelligence cycle by the fire service was vital before conducting in-depth research on the 
subject. The analysis of existing studies and government documents revealed that no 
formal or informal recognition of the intelligence cycle occurs in the wildland fire arena. 
However, initial research indicates that the feasibility of emergency or disaster 
management adoption of an intelligence cycle is realistic and worth pursuing. This 
research also suggests that a similarly viable path for alternative applications of the 
intelligence cycle to the wildland fire problem exists.  
Lastly, this thesis reviewed the relevant regional intelligence entities that can play 
a role in wildfire prevention and control. The GACCs and the national network of fusion 
centers both have strengths and weaknesses related to their effectiveness due to the scope 
and scale of the respective missions. Although a significant number of agencies make up 
the intelligence community, focusing on an ideal dissemination platform was important in 
this thesis. The analysis of available data indicated that the CIA intelligence cycle model 
was ultimately the platform with the most potential and relevance to the wildland fire 




Chapters III, IV, and V focused on creating connections between the intelligence 
cycle and the wildland fire problem. These analyses were primarily the result of 
comparisons between current understanding and practices and the validity of alternative 
interpretations. To frame the intricacies of the intelligence cycle model best, the CIA 
model was analyzed to identify relationships with the wildland fire environment. Due to 
the simplicity of the CIA model, the five phases of the cycle were individually inspected 
to determine relationships between the fire service’s current intelligence practices and 
application to wildland fires. The analysis indicated that the fire service employs some 
steps and processes that reflect a piecemeal approach to the use of intelligence in the 
wildland fire environment. However, the correlation related to wildland fires are not 
strategic nor a reflection of an organized process model, such as the CIA intelligence 
cycle. Still, the evidence that correlations to the CIA intelligence cycle already exist 
supports the idea that the greater use of the intelligence cycle model can be made in the 
future by building on current practices.  
Once the examination of the individual steps of the CIA model showed a 
connection to the wildland fire environment, further assessment was indicated. The 
intelligence collection phase deals with the specific types of INTs, and the analysis 
concluded that they are useful to the wildland fire problem. Although not all types or 
subtypes of the INTs are relevant, the primary collection disciplines of HUMINT, 
MASINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, and OSINT are key to support the fire service best. The 
full spectrum of the INTs allows the fire service to collect the information needed to 
develop intelligence products.  
The fire service’s use of technology among these INTs was identified for the 
individual phases of the intelligence cycle. Once again, this collection was not by design 
to support a formalized intelligence cycle. Regarding the systematic use of technology, 
wildland fire intelligence collection is well established and continues to evolve. The 
analysis in this thesis indicates that ongoing improvements in technology will support a 
more complete and well-developed intelligence cycle in the future with more focus by the 
fire service arena at the local, state, and national levels. This examination identified the 
 90 
value of developing a synthesis of a ground-based and satellite intelligence collection to 
realize an optimal solution for use by fire service decision makers.  
This paper’s consideration of current and future intelligence dissemination 
options focused on the GACCs and the national network of fusion centers. These two 
types of data sources have notably different foci and scope; the fusion center network has 
a broader public safety focus whereas the GACCs provide specific wildland and 
geographic information. The larger role and information gathered and disseminated by 
the fusion center network makes it easier to reach more stakeholders. However, the 
fusion centers lack wildland fire specificity that the GACCs provide. The conclusion by 
the present author is that it is more realistic to enhance the wildland fire centric 
representation at the existing fusion centers with more personnel rather than further 
expand the number of GACCs. Adding additional personnel at fusion centers impacted 
by the wildland fire threat instead of adding more GACCs is more attainable.  
This thesis also analyzed and dissected the Waldo Canyon fire and the 
effectiveness of the fire service in managing it. The case study analysis provided an 
evaluation to determine whether the intelligence cycle and its components were used, 
which determined that no formal intelligence cycle was implemented in handling the fire. 
However, the assessment identified evidence of the employment of the five components 
of the CIA model. As previously observed, the phases were much more organic and 
haphazard in origination as opposed to strategic, intentional, and well organized. Another 
conclusion was that the phases of the cycle did not always take place in a consistent or 
linear time frame. Some of the actionable intelligence existed before the Waldo Canyon 
fire, while other intelligence evolved during or after the incident took place.  
From a holistic perspective, the core concepts of the intelligence cycle commonly 
occur in the wildland fire arena and were evident in the Waldo Canyon fire. However, as 
a formalized process, the cycle is not explicitly defined and continues to be fractured. 
Some aspects of each of the phases of the intelligence cycle were represented in the 
wildland fire process, but only in an informal and unsystematic way. This finding 
suggests that if the intelligence cycle were to be used more deliberately in the wildland 
firefighting profession, improvements in both fire prevention and fire suppression and 
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response may be possible by providing a mechanism to communicate actionable 
intelligence better.  
C. LIMITATIONS 
Implementing any changes from the status quo to improve the strategic use of an 
intelligence cycle that mimics that of the CIA is likely to be difficult. Despite probable 
challenges, the existence of a wildland intelligence apparatus at the GACCs is promising 
and can serve as a building block to work efficiently with the national network of fusion 
centers. As the fire service considers moving forward and proposes changes, questions 
will inevitably arise. Why change what the fire service is currently doing? If it is not 
broken, why change it? When looking at the fire problem as an enduring risk with 
consistently increasing impacts, alternatives should be evaluated. To introduce and 
implement innovation, approaches that will avoid the alienation of the involved agencies 
will be needed. Fire service leaders will need to manage this system change effectively to 
minimize resistance and gain buy-in from all stakeholders.  
The complexities of having multiple stakeholders pose a hurdle to 
implementation, as involved agencies are focused on their individual needs from both a 
geographic responsibility and fiscal perspective, which makes integration, new strategies, 
and other systemic improvements more difficult. Adding to the complexity is the 
organizational oversight that is anchored at the local, state, and federal levels. Given 
these levels and the range and types of agencies involved, obtaining consensus on an 
implementation strategy is problematic. To realize significant change best, policy 
adoption needs to occur at the highest levels, with hard work to gain buy-in from local 
jurisdictions and agencies. Independent of high-level organizational support, the limited 
application of the intelligence cycle in the wildland fire environment is likely.  
As with any substantive policy and implementation changes, funding is an issue, 
as potential costs for a comprehensive and well-integrated intelligence cycle can be 
costly. The costs include orchestrating education, messaging, and implementation in 
addition to new or more technology. Hopefully, the financial challenges can be 
minimized by leveraging existing resources, such as grant opportunities and emerging 
 92 
technologies. However, until the ability to minimize fiscal impacts is validated, funding 
will remain an issue. One option may be to develop and implement a long-term, phased-
in strategic plan for change that can also include gradual increases in costs over time.  
A final limitation derives from the potential for only partial adoption of a 
wildland fire intelligence cycle. Without universal acceptance of a cycle, the possibility 
of stovepiping intelligence is a real concern with problematic impacts on communities 
threatened by wildland fires. Research indicates that a primary issue with intelligence and 
the intelligence collection process is that informational stovepipes do not support 
collaboration and strategic warning, and often result in data silos. The partial 
implementation of an intelligence cycle will most likely result in minimal improvements 
to the current problem. If only some agencies use new wildland intelligence cycle 
processes and others do not, realizing the true potential is problematic. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Driven by the desire to minimize the impacts of disastrous wildland fires, the 
current author provides recommendations for the future. To be implemented successfully, 
several recommendations will need significant high-level policy support. The support 
may be easier to garner as potential benefits are quantified as lives saved, property loss 
reduced, and environmental impacts minimized. Absent adoption of the following 
recommendations, the benefits are only characterized as potentials. The evidence 
indicates that much of the component parts of an intelligence cycle model currently exist 
in the fire service; using that knowledge will help gain buy-in and implementation 
support of end users from a grassroots perspective.  
The current author recommends the following steps for achieving a fully 
developed intelligence cycle in fire service: 
• Adopt the intelligence cycle model at a national level as a mechanism to 
provide a strategic warning for future wildland fires. Starting with the 
adoption of a basic intelligence cycle model provides a mechanism for 
future improvements in wildland fire intelligence. The precise nature of 
the adopted cycle and its fire service-specific nuances will evolve after the 
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recognition of adoption by key stakeholders. The adoption of the 
intelligence cycle that mimics that of the CIA would be evident in written 
policies and training for relevant fire service personnel. It would be 
realized through the production of new intelligence products, such as daily 
wildland threat warnings that included specific communities at risk.  
• Develop a wildland fire-centric intelligence cycle that addresses the 
specific needs of those who will be managing its respective components. 
For an adopted intelligence cycle to be effective it has be simple, 
comprehend and apply. The simplicity of the CIA intelligence cycle will 
increase the chances that it may be successful if adopted by the fire 
service. Undoubtedly, the structure of the traditional CIA intelligence 
cycle process will evolve into an effective tool for fire service that is 
flexible and easily tailored to needs that may vary over time and location. 
A cycle that is elastic and adaptable will allow officials and other key 
stakeholders to use it to meet their nuanced needs and address past 
shortcomings. Intuitively, this cycle may be achieved most readily by 
institutionalizing a feedback component in the intelligence cycle that 
enhances performance through constant evaluation and reassessment over 
time. 
• Institutionalize a wildland fire service component to fusion centers that 
manage the enduring threat of disastrous fires. This type of creative 
adaptation will generate a larger platform to deliver actionable intelligence 
to end users and results in the continual expansion of the scope and scale 
of the fusion centers. The integration of a fire service component to fusion 
centers could include part-time or full-time wildland fire service 
representation at fusion centers located in areas at high risk from wildland 
fires. Staffing fusion centers with experts who have higher levels of 
subject matter expertise will facilitate the generation of more fire service 
related intelligence products to a broader audience that includes more 
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significant numbers of public safety and emergency management 
agencies. 
• Explore funding mechanisms necessary to support the adoption of an 
intelligence cycle. The actual fiscal impacts of adopting a nuanced 
intelligence cycle and integrating wildland fire service representation into 
fusion centers are unknown. Funding to cover the costs of staffing, 
personnel development and training, technology, and both internal and 
external intelligence cycle messaging, would be needed. Establishing 
dedicated budgetary support from participating agencies or leveraging 
existing grants are two possible funding mechanisms.  
• Develop a mechanism to measure the results of an intelligence cycle 
application to the wildland fire problem. To evaluate properly whether the 
application of a full intelligence cycle has been useful, a mechanism must 
be put into place to measure changes in wildland fire life loss, personal 
property damages, environmental damages, and related fiscal impacts. 
Data on those key measures gathered before the implementation of the 
intelligence cycle would be compared to parallel information gathered 
once the wildland fire intelligence cycle has been implemented, and 
should continue annually. Any mechanism generated for this ongoing 
evaluation would need to take into account external factors that could 
influence results, such as weather patterns. The data sets needed to 
validate the use of a wildland intelligence cycle will take several years to 
populate. 
• Conduct further research to identify strengths and weaknesses of the 
intelligence cycle application. As with any policy change, reassessment is 
an integral part of the validation process. Research that focuses on the 
return on investment for fusion centers that add personnel could prove 
beneficial and perhaps lead to additional fusion center expansion. 
Additionally, research that evaluates the effectiveness of explicit wildland 
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intelligence products and their value in specific types of geographical 
areas or situations would be valuable.  
These recommendations provide a sound starting point for what ultimately could 
make substantial alterations to the wildland fire intelligence process. Building a model 
that considers past incidents, the current wildland fire problem, and perceived limitations 
create a more significant opportunity to realize success.  
E. CONCLUSION 
When a known threat to homeland security exists, and the threat impacts life, 
property, and the environment, it is incumbent on policymakers to work towards 
minimizing their negative effects. This thesis outlines processes that can provide 
necessary intelligence to reduce risks to those exposed to wildland fires in systematic 
ways. The development of alternative strategies, such as the adoption and implementation 
of fundamental processes of the intelligence cycle not currently utilized by the fire 
service, can minimize outcomes. Using a well-defined intelligence process focused on 
saving lives, protecting property, and reducing environmental impacts in a fiscally 
responsible manner is a prudent wildland fire policy. The current thesis has argued that 
the intelligence cycle is a valuable framework for thinking and re-evaluating about how 
information about wildland fire threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated. Its 
adoption will ultimately help the fire service better communicate with the communities it 
services, and the resulting enhanced communication will help the fire service be more 
successful in preventing wildland fires and mitigating the effects of those that do occur.  
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APPENDIX. GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATION CENTER AND 











Alaska ● Alaska ● Alaska Information 
and Analysis Center 
 
Northwest ● Washington 
● Oregon 
● Washington State 
Fusion Center 





Northern California ● California 
● Hawaii 
● California State 
Threat Assessment 
Center 
● Hawaii Fusion 
Center 
 
● Central California 
Intelligence Center 
● Northern California 
Regional Intelligence 
Center 
Southern California ● California  ● Los Angeles Joint 
Regional Intelligence 
Center 
● Orange County 
Intelligence 
Assessment Center 
● San Diego Law 
Enforcement 
Coordination Center 
Northern Rockies ● Montana 
● North Dakota 
● Montana Analysis & 
Technical 
Information Center 




Great Basin ● Idaho 
● Nevada 
● Utah 
● Idaho Criminal 
Intelligence Center 
● Utah Statewide 
Information and 
Analysis Center  
● Southern Nevada 
Counter-Terrorism 
Center 
● Nevada Threat 
Analysis Center 
                                                 












Rocky Mountain ● Colorado 
● Kansas 
● Nebraska 




Analysis Center  




Analysis Center  






Southwest ● Arizona 
● New Mexico 
● Texas (West) 
● Arizona Counter 
Terrorism 
Information Center 
● New Mexico All 
Source Intelligence 
Center  

















● New Jersey 
● New York 
● Ohio 
● Pennsylvania 
● Rhode Island 
● Vermont 









● Illinois Statewide 
Terrorism and 
Intelligence Center 
● Indiana Intelligence 
Fusion Center 
● Iowa Division of 
Intelligence and 
Fusion Center 
● Maine Information 










● Minnesota Fusion 
Center 
● Missouri 
● Chicago Crime 
Prevention and 
Information Center 
● Boston Regional 
Intelligence Center 








● St. Louis Fusion 
Center 
● Greater Cincinnati 
Fusion Center 
● Northeast Ohio 
Regional Fusion 
Center 
● Delaware Valley 
Intelligence Center 
● Western Pennsylvania 

















● New Hampshire 
Information and 
Analysis Center 
● New Jersey 
Regional Operations 
Intelligence Center 
● New York State 
Intelligence Center 
● Ohio Statewide 
Terrorism Analysis 















● Wisconsin Statewide 
Intelligence Center 
Analysis Center 







● North Carolina 
● Oklahoma 
● Puerto Rico 
● South Carolina 
● Tennessee 
● Texas (East) 
● Virginia 
 
● Alabama Fusion 
Center  
● Texas Joint Crime 
Information Center 
● Arkansas State 
Fusion Center 
● Florida Fusion 
Center 
● Georgia Information 
Sharing and 




● Louisiana State 
Analytical & Fusion 
Exchange 
● Austin Regional 
Intelligence Center 
● Dallas Fusion Center 
● Houston Regional 
Intelligence Service 
Center 
● North Texas Fusion 
Center 
● Southwest Texas 
Fusion Center 
● Central Florida 
Intelligence Exchange 
● Southeast Florida 
Fusion Center 














● Mississippi Analysis 
and Information 
Center 
● North Carolina 
Information Sharing 




● National Security 
State Information 
Center 
● South Carolina 
Information and 
Intelligence Center  
● Tennessee Fusion 
Center 
● Virginia Fusion 
Center 
TOTAL: 10 TOTAL: 52 TOTAL: 52 TOTAL: 25 
NON GACC ● 50 States  
● Washington 
DC 
● Puerto Rico 
● Mariana Regional 
Fusion Center 
(GUAM) 





 TOTAL: 54 Primary 
Fusion Centers 
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